

Joseph Alsop to Carry On Column by Himself



Joseph Alsop



Stewart Alsop

The New York Herald Tribune column "Matter of Fact," which has been written by Joseph and Stewart Alsop, will henceforth be written exclusively by Joseph Alsop, it was announced yesterday by Ogden R. Reid, president and editor of the Herald Tribune. In a statement, Mr. Reid said:

"For several years Joseph and Stewart Alsop have been dividing their time about equally between writing for magazines and producing together their newspaper column. The brothers have now decided to change this arrangement. Stewart Alsop will devote himself exclusively to magazine writing. Joseph Alsop will produce the newspaper column on a full-time basis."

"I wish Stewart every success as contributing editor of the 'Saturday Evening Post.' Knowing Joe, I am sure his column will continue to be one of the landmarks of informed reporting."

Joseph Alsop, forty-seven, was a member of the Herald Tribune news staff from 1932 to 1937. He joined Robert E. Kintner in writing the syndicated column, "The Capital Parade," for North American Newspaper Alliance from 1937 to 1940. Soon after World War II ended, he teamed with his brother, four years younger, to write "Matter of Fact," now syndicated in about 200 newspapers.

The Alsops are recognized for their understanding and reporting in the complex fields of diplomacy, government and defense. They were first to re-

port, in 1951, of the controversy within the government over whether to produce a hydrogen bomb and, in 1954 and 1955, of a similar conflict on whether this country should embark on an earth satellite program. In 1954, they predicted the Soviet Union would test successfully the first intercontinental ballistic missile, a prediction fulfilled last spring and reported exclusively in their column.

Joseph Alsop will write the column from Washington except for five or six months of the year when he plans to travel in this country and abroad on numerous short trips rather than long journeys. Special arrangements for covering Washington during his absence to produce at least one Washington-written column a week have been made. Stewart Alsop will join the "Post" April 1.

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Matter Of Fact

By Stewart Alsop

Can We Do The Job?

(Editor's Note: This is the last of three columns summarizing Stewart Alsop's conclusions after three months in the Middle East and England.)

If the Truman doctrine of containing Soviet political imperialism is to succeed, it must be followed to its logical conclusion. And if it is to be followed to its logical conclusion, the United States must have some new technique for implementing it financially. One reason why this is so may be sensed from the remark of one experienced British diplomat in the Middle East. The Americans had made a hard choice in the Greek-Turkish aid policy, but the only possible choice. "But my boy," he added, "what a way to go about it!"

No doubt in the back of his mind was the startling contrast between the British financial approach to the Greek problem and the new American approach. So quietly was it done that only after the Greek crisis came to a head did it become known that since the end of the war, counting all expenditures, the British had poured into Greece the fantastic total of 760 million dollars in the pound-sterling equivalent. Thus it is not surprising that the British (very few of whom have ever really grasped how the American political system actually works) were genuinely surprised and shocked to find that a request for one third of this amount from the American Congress was accompanied by an enormous hullabaloo and that the policy of aid to Greece was made to seem hardly less than a declaration of war on the Soviet Union.

This British reaction is interesting only in that it serves to demonstrate the basic weakness inherent in the present technique of implementing American economic foreign policy. The British themselves, as their leading economists in Greece were willing to admit, made a vast miscalculation in handling their economic policy in Greece; they attempted unsuccessfully to buy time in installments, and without any master plan, against an overall world settlement. The United States cannot afford to make the same mistake on a world scale.

For it is obvious that what is true of Greece and Turkey is likewise true in many other parts of the world; in Korea, in China, in the Middle East as a whole, possibly in Italy and France. If the Truman doctrine is to work it must be applied according to a well thought-out master plan in these and other parts of the world. But no master plan is possible if there is to be a piecemeal approach. And above all, world peace will hardly survive a long series of Greek crises, with the Congress being bludgeoned and frightened every six months or so into sticking a costly finger into some new hole in the dike.

YET NO instrumentality now exists for pursuing any other course.

The chief financial instruments are the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank. One is American, the other international (although as the biggest investors in the World Bank the American influence there is evidently preponderant). Aside from the fact that neither institution has much left in the kitty, both suffer from the same limitation. For a reasonable certainty of the return of money lent is a requirement for both.

Thus the operators of the Export-Import Bank and of the World Bank must necessarily be concerned with good financial risks. Yet the areas of the world most closely threatened by Soviet political imperialism are precisely those which are bad financial risks. The United States is thus in the position of having committed itself to a policy and

of having at the same time no way to make this policy work.

Reduced to its simplest terms, the reasoning behind the developing American policy runs like this: As long as the present postwar economic misery continues the opportunity for world-wide expansion of the Soviet Union through the medium of its political instrument, the Communist parties of the world, continues. Therefore, just as it is in the interest of the Soviets that this misery go on, so it is in the interest of the United States to make a determined effort to get the war-wrecked economy of the world back on its feet. There is nothing academic in this assessment.

TWO RECENT developments underline the urgency of the crisis which threatens the Western world. One is the growing monetary crisis described in a recent report. The other is the mounting evidence that the Communist Party line is about to make one of its historic shifts. The real meaning of the French crisis is that there is now a strong likelihood that in those countries where their hold over the labor movements is tight, the Communists may soon discard their policy of off-again-on-again collaboration with governments of which they form a part, and use their power in the labor movements to reduce the slowly recovering national economies to chaos.

In this situation the United States has a choice. Either we can withdraw nervously in continental isolation, close our eyes and cross our fingers, or we can follow the Truman doctrine to its logical conclusion, with the hope that in a reasonably stable and economically sound world situation a true world settlement with the Soviet Union can be made. If the latter choice is the American choice—and it is the only choice which does not lead either to surrender or to an American version of fascism—it has a real chance of success, but only if certain conditions are fulfilled.

One condition is a working partnership agreement with a recovering Great Britain. Another is a practicable master plan based on the grim realities of the world economic situation rather than the present method of attempting feverishly to snuff out fires already well started. A third is the authority—and the money—to carry this master plan through to completion. And the last is a determination of the American people, in the dark days which are surely coming, to see through to the end what they have now started.

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WALLACE TELLS OF ALSOP PART IN CHINA DEAL

The leading role played by Joseph Alsop, a New York Herald Tribune columnist, in the Henry A. Wallace mission to China in 1944, was revealed by Wallace yesterday.

Alsop, reportedly under State department guidance, recently started a campaign against Louis Budenz, the government's leading witness in several Communist trials, asserting that Budenz had committed perjury before the Senate internal security committee.

Wallace, former vice president and Presidential candidate of the Communist-supported Progressive party in 1948, was questioned in executive session by the committee yesterday.

Agreement is Broken

Altho a prepared statement by Wallace was barred from the committee record and he agreed not to make it public, the statement was given to the press late in the day. Committee counsel Robert Morris expressed "surprise" that Wallace had violated his agreement.

Alsop's personal interest in the testimony before the internal security committee was barred by Wallace both in his secret testimony and in his public statement. It was disclosed that Alsop had played an intimate part in the negotiations affecting Chiang Kai-shek and his fight against Communist aggressors in 1944.

Wallace was sent by President Roosevelt to China and Siberia in 1944. He said he was instructed by Roosevelt to "patch up working relations" between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists. Owen Lattimore, a Far Eastern expert named as a Communist agent before the Senate committee, was assigned to go along with him at the suggestion, Wallace said, of Elmer Davis, then head of the office of war information, now a left-wing radio broadcaster.

John Carter Vincent, then chief of the State department's division of Chinese affairs, labeled a Communist in committee testimony, also accompanied him.

Alsop Opposed Chennault

In China, Wallace said, he met Alsop, then an aide to Gen. Claire L. Chennault and assigned by Chennault to escort him. Alsop assumed a very busy role in the succeeding discussions, Wallace told the committee.

When Wallace wanted to recommend Chennault as American commander in China, Alsop vigorously objected to Chennault, whose anti-Communist views were well known. Finally, Wallace said, he decided to suggest Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer for whom Chiang had expressed admiration.

Alsop and Vincent helped in the preparation of Wallace's cable to Roosevelt which carried policy recommendations. These proposals have been labeled pro-Communist by Budenz but Wallace said he did not see how they could be called pro-Communist "in any sense."

Wallace added that his views with respect to China policy during the years following the war, when he was supported by the Communist party, were "a mistake." He said he was now wholly retired from public life and interested only in farming.

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Matter of Fact By Joseph Alsop

They Hope for Nixon

"IT'S A queer thing, isn't it? But I really believe there's nothing wrong between Britain and the United States that three months of Nixon's vigor and realism wouldn't cure."

The speaker was an adherent of the British Labor Party, who had been holding forth on the alarmingly ugly present relationship between the two chief Western allies. It struck him as "queer" that he should hold the beliefs he expressed because, like most other Englishmen of his sort, he had formerly thought the Vice President was just about as low as a snake's belly.

There really is something very odd and mystifying, moreover, in the almost complete transformation of the overseas estimate of Richard Nixon. No doubt his generally astute handling of his own difficult position has made an impression, even abroad. No doubt, too, much good has been done by certain specific proofs of the Vice President's good sense, such as his sober answer to the silly jokes about the sputnik that other Administration leaders at first lamely attempted.

But in the last analysis, one cannot really pinpoint the ways in which Nixon has changed our allies' common image of him. One can only record the fact that Nixon used to be thought of as a villain and is now thought of as a white hope.

IN HONESTY, alas, it is

necessary to add that the happy transformation of the Nixon image is certainly due in part to an unhappy transformation of the Eisenhower image. In Britain, in France, and in the other countries of the western alliance, no one doubts the President's essential goodness, his high purposes, or his dedication to peace, any more than they do here.

But a very curious thing has happened in the last 12 years. The President of the United States, simply by virtue of his occupancy of the White House, has now become the President of the West as well. This is how President Eisenhower is judged abroad.

There are plenty of Americans who have always doubted whether the President was right to adopt his curiously passive approach to his great office. They have wondered whether the vast and stormy forces of our times could be mastered by a President who merely presides, who reigns but does not rule. An increasing number of Americans, quite obviously, are also wondering, whether it was not a cruel injustice to beg and badger an already ill man to stand for a second term in the most taxing job in the world.

These trends of opinion have recently gained strength in this country in a way that really startles a returning traveler. And these same trends, so strong in America, are now in full control abroad. Rightly or wrongly, the President's performance in his other job as "President of the West" has ended by causing deep and universal disappointment. Among our allies, there is still liking for the man. But there is no

faith in his leadership; and there is no hope that his leadership will ever inspire faith in the future.

THIS LOSS of faith in Mr. Eisenhower is a strong strand of, in turn, the stronger and stronger web of bitterness against the United States that overspreads the entire Western alliance. In the post-war, pre-Eisenhower years, this country's allies had come to expect and accept and rely on vigorous American leadership. Rightly or wrongly, they do not think they have got this kind of leadership from Mr. Eisenhower. They therefore feel, in an illogical but quite visible way, as though they had been cheated of a long established right.

Equally illogically, the desire for vigorous and decisive American leadership is just as strong as ever, despite the increasing prevalence of anti-American bitterness. In the sad time after the President's recent stroke, the true state of affairs was revealed with harsh clarity. In Britain, for example, the professionally anti-American extreme left united with the equally anti-American extreme right, in openly praying that the President would hand over his duties to the Vice President. They put no further hope in Mr. Eisenhower; they had begun to hope much from Nixon; and they said so without pretense of concealment.

All of which only means that the former unity and purpose of the Western alliance can still be retrieved by the right kind of American leadership, whoever may offer it. Irretrievable local defeats, in the Middle East, for instance, may later render the whole situation irretrievable. But it can still be saved today.

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Alsops Splitting As Writing Team

NEW YORK, Mar. 10 (AP).—The New York Herald Tribune said last night columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop will split up as a writing team.

Ogden R. Reid, president and editor of the Herald Tribune, which syndicates the Alsop column to about 200 other newspapers across the country, said the column will be written exclusively by Joseph Alsop.

Mr. Reid said Stewart Alsop will devote himself exclusively to magazine writing and will be a contributing editor to the Saturday Evening Post. He will join the Post April 1.

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Conspiracy of Silence

Stewart Alsop's April 10 column on the political eclipse (and, Mr. Alsop hopes, imminent electoral demise) of Senator McCarthy is interesting because, although noting the adverse effects of senatorial censure and presidential revulsion on McCarthy's career, Mr. Alsop modestly (or shrewdly) fails to mention the part his own profession played in shunting the Senator out of the limelight.

The fact is, and Mr. Alsop should know it better than almost any other journalist, that the "shrinking down of McCarthy" did not involve any process nearly as occult as the Jivaro tribe's head-shrinking formula.

Rather, McCarthy, grown turgid with oceans of printer's ink and volumes of controversy, was brought down to size by the simple, homely and enormously effective conspiracy of silence which everyone except Mr. Alsop quite readily acknowledges.

McCarthy is still getting the silent treatment, although now the interdict is necessarily being relaxed so that the pundits can throw an occasional brickbat in McCarthy's direction and bouquets in the direction of any potential opposition, apparently on the theory that almost anyone would be preferable to the unhorsed knight.

One wonders whether Mr. Alsop so glibly dismisses the passing of McCarthy into political limbo ("... he disappeared from the public view as quickly as midget golf in the 30s, or mah-jongg in the 20s") without any mention of the leading role played by the press, because of reluctance to call attention to the terrible puissance of the weapon used against McCarthy, a weapon which may be used for projects less worthy than conferring pariahhood upon a demagogue.

DONALD RALBOVSKY.

Washington.

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Mr. Wick 5634	Miss <i>[Signature]</i>
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CRIME RECORDS SECTION

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
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Charles J. Vondelli

JOHN ALSOP

How many eggheads?

"all the eggheads love Stevenson, but how many eggheads do you think there are?" Months later, Stew Alsop got around to identifying the man who introduced the word egghead to the modern political vocabulary. The "rising young Connecticut Republican" was Insurance Executive John deKoven Alsop, now 42, youngest brother of Columnists Joseph, 47, and Stewart, 43, and by all odds the least-known of the brothers Alsop. Indeed, precious few of generally Fair-Dealing Joe's and Stew's 12 million paid-up readers even knew that they had a brother—much less a Republican.

In his home state of Connecticut, John Alsop carries some impressive credentials. He belongs to an old Avon (Conn.) family, went to exclusive Groton and Yale ('37), served overseas in the cloak-and-dagger OSS in World War II, steadily climbed the promotion ladder in Hartford's Mutual Insurance Co. from field inspector ('46) to president ('53), twice won election to the Connecticut General Assembly (1947 and 1949), and won friends among Eisenhower Republicans as a Connecticut Yankee for Ike in both 1952 and 1956.

Last week John Alsop decided to present his credentials to the electorate, announced his candidacy for this year's G.O.P. nomination for governor. If he gets past four other Republican hopefuls at a state convention this June, the least-known Alsop brother will come up against incumbent Democratic Governor Abraham Ribicoff, no egghead, but one of the ablest vote-getters in Connecticut.

Welcome Mat

Since 1948, his close alliance with U.A.W.-C.I.O. President Walter Reuther has helped G. Mennen Williams overcome the violent opposition of Michigan industrialists, win five elections for governor. But in a national presidential election,

sure it shocks anyone else who has an idea of morality."

Last week it developed that a good deal depended on whose morality was involved. Republican Wolverton began expounding his ethical ideas to Witness Paul Porter, chairman of the FCC during the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, now counsel for a losing applicant for Miami's Channel 10. That was what canny Lawyer Porter had been waiting for. Smiling owlishly, he reached into a briefcase, produced a letter from a Congressman to the FCC requesting special action on a constituent's application for TV Channel 17 in Camden, N.J. Date of letter: March 30, 1953. Sender of letter: Representative Wolverton.

Visibly suffering from a different kind of shock, Representative Wolverton spent the lunch hour searching for another copy of the letter, finally found one in the National Archives, returned to the hearing room that afternoon with an indignant explanation: It was an "inconsequential letter," and if, "after 32 years, only one letter can be produced, I have a lot to be thankful for." Subcommittee Chairman Oren Harris, an Arkansas Democrat who has been less excited all along than Wolverton about congressional pressures on the FCC, cut in quickly. "There is no impropriety," said Harris. "Hearing is adjourned."

Another day last week the subcommittee met President Eisenhower's brother-in-law, Colonel George Gordon Moore Jr., 54, accused last month by ousted Subcommittee Counsel Bernard Schwartz (TIME, Feb. 24) of trying to swing FCC decisions through his membership by marriage in "the White House clique." Colonel Moore, a crisp and courtly Texan, was born in Galveston, educated at St. Mary's Seminary (Roman Catholic) at La Porte, Texas, in 1940 married Mabel Frances



GEORGE GORDON MOORE
How many assets?

Doud, younger sister of Army Wife Mamie Doud Eisenhower. In 1942 Moore entered the Army, rose from second lieutenant to lieutenant colonel in the Quartermaster Corps, returned to civilian life in 1951 "to make money." Occupation since then: a roving man-about-business, with varied interests in Caribbean green sugar, U.S. freight airlines, a shipyard in Dictator Rafael Trujillo's Dominican Republic, etc.

Last week George Gordon Moore appeared voluntarily before the House subcommittee, made some of his financial records available, insisted convincingly that he had never used the Eisenhowers to help his business fortunes—"No, sir!" After getting a clean bill and friendly smiles from the subcommittee, Moore departed, saying: "Being an Eisenhower in-law from a business standpoint can be more of a liability than an asset."

POLITICAL NOTES

Bad News for the G.O.P.

President Eisenhower's political popularity rating is down five Gallup poll percentage points below his previous low of 57%, recorded just after the 1954 congressional elections and again after the Little Rock segregation crisis last year. Results of last week's survey of opinion on the way Ike is doing his job:

Approve	52%
Disapprove	33%
No opinion	15%

Congressional Republicans, who figure by rough rule of thumb that they must get 55% of the vote outside the Democratic South to win this year's congressional elections, found themselves at the lowest low since 1936. Gallup poll of Northerners:

Republicans	46%
Democrats	54%

The congressional results nationwide:

Republicans	44%
Democrats	56%

In both the presidential and congressional polls, Gallup found one overriding reason for the G.O.P. slump: the recession and fear of unemployment. In still another poll, Gallup reported that unemployment had become the problem of greatest public concern. Just a month before, 30% had listed keeping the peace as the nation's top problem, against 7% naming unemployment. Last week's figures: unemployment 40%; keeping the peace 17%. This, said the pollsters, was the first time since Depression year 1937 that unemployment had been rated the U.S.'s No. 1 problem.

The Third Brother

Wrote Columnist Stewart Alsop, an Adlai Stevenson devotee, during the 1952 presidential campaign: "This reporter [recently] remarked to a rising young Connecticut Republican that a good many intelligent people, who would be considered normally Republican, obviously admired Stevenson. 'Sure,' was the reply,



Charles J. Vendetti

JOHN ALSOP

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"all the eggheads love Stevenson, but how many eggheads do you think there are?" Months later, Stew Alsop got around to identifying the man who introduced the word egghead to the modern political vocabulary. The "rising young Connecticut Republican" was Insurance Executive John deKoven Alsop, now 42, youngest brother of Columnists Joseph, 47, and Stewart, 43, and by all odds the least-known of the brothers Alsop. Indeed, precious few of generally Fair-Dealing Joe's and Stew's 12 million paid-up readers even knew that they had a brother—much less a Republican.

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MATTER OF FACT

By STEWART ALSOP

The State of the President

WASHINGTON.

Now that the President has given his report on the state of the nation, a report on the state of the President seems in order. The state of the President, according to those who should know, can be summed up very briefly. It is good.

Take the state of the Presidential health first. No President, and probably no man in history, has ever had his physical condition subjected to such careful and continuous scrutiny. His doctors brood over him like a dozen hens with one chick. Almost every day, his blood is tested, his blood pressure taken and his pulse felt. The mildest of complaints—a headache or a stiff shoulder—is treated like a Federal offense.



Stewart Alsop

Aside from this daily testing and probing, and the occasional big ceremonial hospital examinations, the President is also very regularly subjected to searching check-ups at the White House. Only a few days ago, for example, Dr. Thomas Mattingly, the heart specialist, performed a thorough examination, and gave the President a clean bill of health.

The President grumbled a bit at first over all this fussing over him. But there are certain compensations. Before his ileitis operation, he used to have stomach cramps—mostly mild, but occasionally very painful—much more often than was generally known. He has not had them recently, and in this sense, bar recurrence, he is better off than before his operation.

There are other compensations. His doctors have decided that regular exercise is not only good for the President, but essential to his well-being. At Gettysburg, recuperating from his operation, the President was denied all exercise, and he brooded, and stubbornly refused to gain weight, which worried the doctors more than they cared to admit. But as soon as he got a golf stick in his hand, his weight began to come back, and the President now again has to keep a watchful eye on the scales.

The President goes to bed early, usually by nine, gets up early, usually by seven, and works hard all morning. But every afternoon he knocks off work to exercise, with the unclouded conscience of a man who is only following doctors' orders. He gets in some golf almost every fair day, and a swim is a regular afternoon occurrence, rain or shine. He swims in the heated White House pool, sometimes alone, sometimes with a grandchild, and often with his boon companion, George Allen, perennial friend of Presidents.

The President's relaxations are mild—a Western movie (the only kind he likes); a whisky and soda or sometimes two (also ordered by his doctors); and bridge, most often with Allen, Gen. Alfred Gruenther, and William Robinson, president of the Coca-Cola Company.

Under this regimen, according to those who see him often, the President is in an excellent state of mind as well as health. He still blows up from time to time, about small matters. When he found that he had signed a proclamation fixing the date of Thanksgiving on the day fixed by Franklin Roosevelt, rather than the traditional date, he almost blew the roof off the White House. When irked, he likes to fix members of his staff with a

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basilisk eye, and repeat an old Army saying: "No explanations are required, because no explanations will be accepted."

But he is a great deal calmer in spirit than he once was. He still likes to get away, but he no longer regards the White House as a prison. Above all, though he still hesitates to use the full power of the Presidency, he has a sense of inner assurance he lacked in his first years as President.

To this optimistic report on the state of the President, two warning footnotes must be added. First, obviously, there is no way to insure a man with the President's medical history against accidents. Second, less obviously, the President's enormous prestige is, in a sense, a positive danger to him.

His staff members and most of the other men with access to him are scared of him, less because of his peppery temper than because he has come to seem somehow larger than life. There is hardly anyone now who is willing to stand up to him, to argue with him, to criticize his policies, to point bluntly to the dangers and difficulties ahead. The Democrats, cowed by the Eisenhower political magic, hardly dare breathe a word against him, while the President is more immune from press criticism than any of his predecessors without exception.

Even before his first election, Eisenhower used to tell friends that the great danger was that he would be transformed into a kind of miracle worker, who could supposedly solve all problems with a wave of a wand. That danger is now very real, and it is a danger which must be taken most seriously in a democracy. Meanwhile it is good to know that the state of the President is good.

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MATTER OF FACT

By STEWART ALSOP

No Big Switch

HARLEM.

The Negroes, whose votes could be decisive in a whole series of important states, are by no means wildly enthusiastic about Adlai Stevenson. But they are even less enthusiastic about Dwight D. Eisenhower. And bar some dramatic and effective last minute gesture on the civil rights issue, the President has missed an opportunity to cut heavily into the huge majority Stevenson scored among Negroes in 1952.



Stewart Alsop

These conclusions spring from many hours of interviewing Negro voters in this vast city-within-a-city, the greatest concentration of Negro voters in the country, in company with Louis Harris, the professional public opinion expert.

The interviewing started in the slum areas. In several hours of climbing up and down the wooden stairs of rickety fire traps, we found not a single Negro voter who intended to vote Republican. Asked why, almost all would respond in much the same words: "We're poor people, and the Democrats are more for the poor people."

By the same token, in the slum buildings we met hardly any one who was really stirred by the civil rights issue. What aroused the passions of the slum dwellers was the rent they paid for their miserable quarters. "They condemn the building and then double the rent," said a big man furiously. "Now is that right?" He had been utterly apathetic about civil rights.

If there is such a thing as a solid bloc vote, it is in the Negro slums, where the people vote Democratic almost instinctively—if they vote at all. At least in the immediately foreseeable future, there is really no way for the Republicans to make important gains in the Harlem slums.

But by no means all of Harlem is slum, fortunately. And the change in political and social atmosphere when you move out of the slums and into one of the low-cost housing projects, or into a respectable apartment house, is downright astonishing.

Not that there is much increase in Republican sentiment. Even in the really elegant apartments, the vast majority of Negroes consider themselves Democrats. (Our count, for what it is worth, was Stevenson 63 per cent, Eisenhower 20 per cent, don't know 17 per cent, as against a 1952 vote of Stevenson 78 per cent, Eisenhower 22 per cent.)

The real difference is that, outside the slum areas, there are a lot of Negro voters who might have been persuaded to switch to Eisenhower—enough to make a big difference at the polls.

There is one issue, and one issue alone, which could cause such a switch—civil rights.

Harris had prepared questions on such matters as the Autherine Lucy case, the Emmett Till case, and the riots at Clinton, Tenn., to test awareness of the civil rights issue. In the slums, more often than not, the questions elicited no response at all. In the projects and apartments, we at length stopped asking the questions—we had learned that everybody knew all the answers in detail. Outside the slums apathy about civil rights is replaced by a single-minded passion.

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Matter of FactNot From Beautiful Blonde SpiesBy Stewart Alsop

IT IS STRANGE how the highest Administration officials stubbornly disbelieve what their own intelligence experts tell them. Take, for example, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson's recent testimony before the House Appropriations Committee:

"You know, we cannot get very far ahead of them (the Soviets), because we talk so much in this country and write so many articles and publish so many pictures and magazine articles that they are always bound to be able to do it. Most of their weapons of course, really came out of the Western world..."

No national myth dies harder than the notion that the Soviets are technically backward, capable only of slavishly copying what the West has already produced. But it is really very odd that Secretary Wilson, after more than three years in office, should still believe in this comfortable myth. For throughout those three years, Wilson has been literally deluged with evidence pointing in precisely the opposite direction.

There is, moreover, nothing particularly mysterious about the great bulk of this evidence—it does not come from beautiful blonde spies.

MOST OF IT comes, instead, from such items as a long, profusely illustrated book called "Aviation Gas Turbine Engines," by G. S. Skubachevski. His formidable work was published in Moscow last year and it is freely available in technical bookshops in the Soviet Union. When it arrived in Washington recently it caused quite a fluttering in the intelligence dovescotes.

It contained, for one thing, numerous cut away drawings of something called a "split compressor engine." The split compressor system is used in the most advanced American jet engine design, and all diagrams and performance data are top secret. Yet here was a mere textbook, distributed to mere student engineers in the Soviet Union, containing numerous detailed diagrams of the split compressor engine.

The notion that "they get it all from spies," which is a companion myth to the "backward Russians" myth, does not hold up in this case either. The text of the book contains not only a highly sophisticated discussion of the split compressor engine, but a number of jet engineering techniques new to American ex-

perts. Soviet spies could not have stolen these ideas from us, simply because we didn't have them.

Reliable information on Soviet weapons progress from such overt, non-cloak-and-dagger sources as Skubachevski's book, is not as impossibly difficult to come by as it is often cracked up to be. Last year, for example, the magazine "Aviation Week" published excellent photographs of the mass flights over Moscow of the new Soviet heavy bomber, the Bison—the same plane which Wilson had previously opined was a fake, or a mere handmade prototype.

The publication of these photographs caused horror in the Pentagon, and the editor of the magazine was called on the carpet to explain where he got such "top secret" material. He explained that he had called the New York representative of Sovfoto, the Soviet propaganda agency. Soviet had happily offered him as many excellent photographs as he could use, and motion picture films of the overflights as well.

THE NOTION that all information about Soviet weapons developments comes from beautiful but highly untrustworthy blonde spies is one reason why such officials as Wilson do not really believe their own intelligence. Another reason is that men like Wilson and Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey tend to regard the intelligence experts as impractical longchairs.

Secretary Humphrey, for example, recently became much exercised when he learned from a British steel tycoon who had made a tour of the Soviet Union that Soviet steel mills were as good as the best in Britain. As a member of the National Security Council, Humphrey had been repeatedly told exactly the same thing in intelligence briefings. But he only really believed it when he learned it from a fellow businessman and payroll-meeter.

A third reason is that the Central Intelligence Agency is prohibited from making comparative estimates of Soviet and American weapons development, so that the estimates lack meaning and impact. But there is also another reason why high officials tend to disbelieve or disregard their own intelligence experts. Believing them would inexorably suggest all sorts of highly expensive and highly inconvenient action.

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Stewart Alsop

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Adlai Stevenson is judged almost entirely by this standard, and he is often found wanting. Many Negroes are very moderate on the desegregation — "you can't change people overnight," they say. But to many others "moderation" is a dirty word, and there is little enthusiasm among them for Stevenson as the apostle of moderation.

Among these we found a few — a very few — who meant to vote for Eisenhower. There was an intellectual lawyer who admired Stevenson, hated Nixon, but meant to vote for the President because "we'll never get anywhere as long as the Democrats think they own us." There was a seaman who credited the President with desegregation in the Navy — "you wouldn't believe how different it is," he said.

Yet the Administration gets very little credit for its civil rights achievements — no one person gave the Republicans any credit for the Supreme Court school decision, for example. And fully four out of ten cited the President's failure to intervene in the Clinton riots as evidence of his indifference on the civil rights issue.

After many hours of interviewing, Harris and this reporter felt certain that the President had missed a major political opportunity. He might have picked up 10 or 15 per cent of the Negro vote by an all-out stand on civil rights — enough to decide a close election. The fact that the President was almost certainly right, in terms of national unity, in adopting a go-slow policy, is no doubt beside the point. In strictly political terms, the point is that the much-advertised big switch to Eisenhower among Negro voters looks instead like a little switch, or even, conceivably, no switch at all.

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Matter of Fact . . . By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

Soviet IRBM

THE AMERICAN Government now has convincing evidence that the Soviet Union has built a guided rocket with a striking range of approximately 1500 miles.

This is the so-called intermediate range ballistic missile, or IRBM, in common Pentagon jargon. Building an American IRBM is the purpose of newly authorized, highest priority weapons development programs of the United States Army and Air Force.

There have been earlier reports that the Soviets might have this weapon which the American services have just begun scrambling to get. These have come from several sources, notably Sen. Henry Jackson of Washington. This is the first time, however, that it has been possible to state on undoubted authority that the Pentagon has in its hands virtually conclusive evidence of the existence of a Soviet IRBM.

There is a good deal more than this, in fact. One new weapon may be the result of a brilliant accidental breakthrough. Producing a family of new weapons requires a general forward movement on all technical fronts, and the evidence indicates that the Soviets have such a family of intermediate ballistic missiles with ranges varying from 800 miles to 1500.

THIS IN TURN confirms the long-prevalent suspicion that the Soviets have achieved massive advances in the missile art. To be sure, the data are lacking to show positively whether the Soviet test missiles have yet attained satisfactory accuracy in guidance. It is not positively known, either, whether these test missiles have been capable of being fitted with a nuclear warhead.

Yet these two unknowns in the equation are not so impressive as they may seem at first glance. The problem of fitting a nuclear warhead is

relatively minor, compared to the really basic problems of ballistic missile design.

For these reasons, it must now be assumed that the time is fairly near at hand, if indeed it has not been reached already, when the Soviets will pass from the testing phase into the vital phase of producing intermediate range ballistic missiles in militarily significant quantities. By the same token, it is also reasonable to suppose that the Soviets are well on their way to building the even more important intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM—the ultimate weapon which will carry a nuclear warhead from continent to continent.

THE SOVIET IRBM tests are also rather final and decisive proof that this country has lagged far behind in missile development. Until a few months ago, the American missile program altogether neglected the intermediate ranges.

There were short range, tactical missile projects, such as those which have centered at the Army's Redstone Laboratory. There were also long-range projects sponsored by the Air Force—"Atlas," for an intercontinental ballistic missile; "Navajo," for an intercontinental ramjet; and the highly dubious "Snark," for a long-range pilotless aircraft.

But the projects for intermediate range ballistic missiles only came to life some months ago. At that time the National Security Council, no doubt partly moved by the news of the Soviet IRBM, gave an over-riding priority to guided missile development. Final approval of the Army's paper plans for producing an IRBM at the Redstone Laboratory was granted only last week by the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Science Advisory Committee headed by Dr. John von Neumann.

BESIDES the Army project, there is one more American

IRBM project controlled by the Air Force.

Thus the Soviets now have an intermediate range missile, which we do not have and can hardly get for a considerable time to come. In the form of this IRBM, the Soviets also have a solid leg in the race for the intercontinental missile, which we are now trying to win by a crash effort.

Curiously enough, however, the most important short-run effect of the Soviet success with the IRBM may well prove to be its effect on the American Strategic Air Command. Very few Americans realize that the great SAC force, which is the mainspring of American and free world strategy, is not really a long-range air force. Yet about 80 per cent of SAC's fighting aircraft are medium-range B-47s.

TO REACH Soviet targets, the B-47s must either take off from overseas airbases, or else be twice refueled in the air. SAC's tanker fleet is insufficient to provide double air-refueling for more than about one-fifth of SAC's 1500 B-47s. Hence SAC today is almost wholly dependent on its overseas bases. And it is precisely SAC's overseas airbases that the new Soviet IRBMs will threaten most directly.

With the overseas bases out of commission, in turn, there is every reason to think that our "massive retaliation" would not be nearly massive enough. The SAC commander, Gen. Curtis LeMay, would then be able to mount an attack on the scale of only a little more than 600 aircraft.

This explains, no doubt, why Gen. LeMay asked this year to have his B-47s replaced by urgent and greatly stepped-up production of B-52s. His request was rejected for reasons of budgetary economy, but here again, the news of the Soviet IRBM would seem to change the picture.

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Matter of Fact

By Stewart Alsop

Successor to Molotov?

DMITRI T. Shepilov, editor and publisher of "Pravda," is regarded in Washington and London as the most probable successor to Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov. Interviewed by this reporter, Mr. Shepilov rather angrily branded this view of his future as "nonsense" and "irresponsible speculation."



Alsop

Whether or not Mr. Shepilov is over-modest about his future, the interview seems worth describing. Everything Mr. Shepilov said was, of course, straight down the party line. This is hardly surprising, since Mr. Shepilov, as chief of the Russian Communist Party's newspaper, is in an excellent position to know the party line.

At any rate, future Foreign Minister or not, Mr. Shepilov is regarded in knowledgeable circles as a coming man in the younger generation of Soviet leaders. And the interview, straight down the line as it is, gives some insight into the state of mind of this generation of new Soviet men.

Mr. Shepilov looks and talks like a comer. He is a big, handsome man with a tired middle-aged face, copious gray hair and an authoritative manner of speaking. He brushed off most questions about the forthcoming four-power conference, saying these matters were covered by Mr. Molotov's press conference in San Francisco. The interview thus became a sort of long, doctrinal debate, in which neither side could wholly understand the other. What follows does not pretend to cover all that was said, but only to give a fair sample of what it is like to talk things over with a Soviet Communist leader.

WHY WAS THE Soviet Union always attacking the United States for a policy of "position of strength," when it was obvious that the Soviet Union itself favored a strong military position?

Mr. Shepilov: "From the very first day the main line of our policy has been peaceful coexistence with all countries in spite of differences between social systems."

How about Lenin's prediction of a "series of fearful clashes" between the capitalist and Communist systems? Were not the powerful Soviet forces in preparation for just such clashes?

Mr. Shepilov: "From our point of view, it is as inevitable as night follows day that the capitalist system will be replaced by the socialist system."

But how about those "fearful clashes"? Mr. Shepilov replied firmly that there would be no "export of revolution at all." (This was the only point where both sides seemed to be talking about different things.)

Mr. Shepilov went on to say that it was "necessary to be strong to defend our country," but added with obvious conviction that this was "not a policy of strength." The distinction remained a trifle fuzzy to this reporter.

MR. SHEPILOV continuing: "We have no need to use our economic strength to impose our system on anybody."

Then how about the satellite countries? "This question of the so-called satellites is a cracked old record." Anyway, it is "impossible to believe that any people could tolerate any system against their will."

Again, or so it seemed to this reporter, Mr. Shepilov spoke as though genuinely convinced that the Eastern European countries adopted communism of their own free will. Throughout the interview, there was a faintly haunted feeling of trying unsuccessfully to shout across an unbridgeable gulf.

The talk turned to the Soviet Union's disarmament proposal. Mr. Shepilov suggested, politely, that the United States did not "really want to disarm." The Soviet Union, he insisted, was by contrast absolutely sincere. "We could stand 100 million rubles a year much more effectively for peaceful competition with the capitalist countries than for arms."

What about inspection? "We are prepared to make such a system of control quite sufficient for all needs . . . It is difficult to imagine going further than our recent proposal for inspection in ports and railway lines."

FINALLY, after two hours of inconclusive fencing, vodka, wine and delicious caviar were served. But between gulps, the fencing continued. The Iron Curtain, Mr. Shepilov and his subordinates contended, was really of American manufacture. (The McCarran-McLeod nonsense, it must be admitted, gave Mr. Shepilov some talking points.) Then there was a last shot in the dark. Might not Mr. Malenkov have been right about a hydrogen war destroying world civilization? This seemed to touch a sensitive nerve.

"We consider," said Mr. Shepilov with great weight, "that civilization will not die. Instead, the more bases the Americans establish, the more quickly will capitalism die, because the people will rise against American imperialism."

The interview ended shortly thereafter, with many expressions of hope for better relations. No one seemed to see any element of contradiction between such a hope and Mr. Shepilov's confident prediction. For this reporter, the interview served to underline at least one fact—that whatever change there may have been in Soviet policy, it is in no sense whatever a basic or doctrinal change.

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Matter of Fact By Stewart Alsop

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Matter of Fact By Stewart Alsop

In the Skies Over Moscow

MOSCOW—On Tuesday of last week there was an impressive display here of Soviet technological achievement.

On the morning before the afternoon reception for Indian Prime Minister Nehru in the Moscow Stadium, between 150 and 200 of the newest type Soviet jet aircraft were flown over Moscow.



Alsop

The flights were largely concentrated in the area between Tushenoe Airport and the Kremlin. They took place for the most part shortly before noon. There is no available breakdown here of the number and type of planes flown. But there were numerous large new turbo-prop bombers of the type believed in the West to be adapted for air refueling purposes. There were particularly large flights of the two-engined medium bomber known in the West as the Badger. And there were large flights of fighter aircraft, including the advanced type known in the West as the Farmer.

The very large four-engine bomber known in the West as the Bison was not observed on Tuesday. But flights of a dozen or so of this aircraft, perhaps the most impressive Soviet achievement in the field of airpower, have been observed on more than one occasion since the now famous May overflights. Indeed, the Tuesday overflights were exceptional only that more

planes were flown than usual. Flights of the new Soviet jet planes, usually at around 11 o'clock in the morning or around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, have become almost routine in recent weeks.

THESE FLIGHTS are presumably in preparation for the display of Soviet airpower scheduled for Red Air Force Day. The date for Red Air Force Day has not been set, but it is expected to take place on a Sunday early in July. No new types have been flown since the May overflights. But it would obviously not be surprising if new Soviet aircraft models of advanced design were displayed on Red Air Force Day. It is possible, for example, that the Delta-wing aircraft of radical design and revolutionary performance, about which there have been rumors in the foreign press, might be flown. But this is, of course, the sheerest speculation.

So, of course, is any attempt to interpret the reasons for the overflights. But what is sometimes overlooked in Washington is that these flights are witnessed not only by a comparative handful of foreigners but by millions of Soviet citizens in this metropolis.

By a brilliant and concentrated propaganda campaign, the Soviet people have become profoundly convinced that the peace will never be broken by the Soviet government but only by foreign aggressors. The overflights provide one way of further convincing the Soviet people that the government has the means to prevent this from happening.

The Soviet government must also, of course, be entirely aware that foreign observers witness the overflights. To put the matter colloquially, the overflights provide a way of saying, "Look, if you want to get tough, we can get tough, too."

At any rate, the planes now being flown by the Red Air Force unquestionably represent a genuine triumph of Soviet technology. It is impossible even to speculate intelligently on the economic cost of this achievement.

But the resources of this immense country are very great, and can be concentrated to achieve a single end in a way most difficult to repeat in the United States. As soon as the Soviet Union broke the American atomic monopoly, it should have been obvious that they would concentrate their resources to achieve an efficient means of delivery. And their technological triumph in the nuclear field should have foreshadowed a similar triumph in the field of air power.

AT THE VERY least, the overflights here should provide a brake on Western smugness, and especially on the particular brand of smugness enjoyed in Washington. The United States has a national habit of judging national power in terms of the number of automobiles per thousand, or even in terms of the elegance of the plumbing. There is no doubt that there are more cars in the United States than here and that the plumbing is superior. But a better index of true national power is to be found in the remarkable aircraft which now regularly appear in the Moscow skies.

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
As Pegler Sees It

The American Press-- And What's Wrong With It

By WESTBROOK PEGLER

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THE ALSOP FEATURE in the New York Herald Tribune bewails an old tendency of bureaucrats to hold back information from reporters. It describes a "censorship" which, in the imagination of the Alsop boys, has much in common with the ways of Hitler and the Duce.



WESTBROOK PEGLER

They think this is an external menace to freedom of the press while I maintain that reporters ought to get out and hustle and quit whining because the people on the beat do not volunteer news.

The same condition is found in every city hall, county courthouse and police headquarters with the important difference that the boys in those brackets usually have no equivalent of the National Press Club in which to consult lobbyists and other gossips.

Another feature of Washington journalism is the drinking party which has been a poisonous phenomenon since repeal, with females weaving webs and nonentities wheedling publicity by imparting information, not necessarily true, to syndicated bums who couldn't write their way out of kindergarten.

I agree that the press is in bad shape, but maintain that this is an inside job. We suffer less, if any, from secrecy imposed by the Pentagon, than from an unwritten book of absolute verbotens amounting to an iron curtain excluding much truth from publication.

I am confident that the Alsops, in common with most other ink-stained serfs, are aware of the same condition, for I have seen evidence in their own Herald Tribune,

UNTIL A FEW YEARS AGO, I found myself writing now and again that our press was the best in the world. I really thought it was.

It may be, but that is a pathetic boast if true.

The exclusion of certain lines of information and the flagrant misrepresentation of facts to favor the "policy" of the owning corporations have had an interesting result, as yet no bigger than a man's hand.

In my youth we had a small and futile litter of weekly and monthly magazines, most of them little more than pamphlets, which raised shrill voices for socialism of various shades and for or against the more stalwart sects.

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BRANIGAN

Joseph C. Alsop

Stewart C. Alsop

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Date:

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Matter of Fact By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

"Security" vs. Democracy

UNTIL VERY recently, the American people's right to know the basic facts of their national situation was never questioned for an instant. The people's right to know was properly regarded as the main-spring of our democracy.

Now, however, no one seems to doubt the American Government's right to bamboozle people by the concealing of the life-and-death facts. The Eisenhower Administration is actively seeking to install a peacetime censorship in America. The censorship has as yet aroused very little opposition. And there was no word of protest, or even comment, when the thinking behind that censorship was unblushingly confessed a few weeks ago.

The confession was made by the former secretary of the National Security Council, Robert Cutler, in a speech to the Associated Harvard Clubs. The Cutler views on the measure of truth that ought to be told the people have been specially commended to the White House staff by the President himself. This incredible speech, then, can be taken as accurately reflecting the official White House line.

IN A MORASS of somewhat self-satisfied verbiage, Cutler makes two central points. First, he declares that the people should be told no fact included in any document classified confidential or above; and should be especially kept from knowing any facts about thermonuclear or other weapons; the status of our own defense effort; intelligence from the rest of the world which, of course, includes the status of the enemy defense effort and enemy intentions, and the reasons for our national security, policies and character of our current diplomacy.

In short, all facts of real significance—"all the vast paraphernalia that goes into executive decision-making"—are to be kept from the American people. This is because of Cutler's second point. "Theirs is not to reason why," he in-

effect says of the American people. According to Cutler, national decision should be made, not by the people, but by the President alone. At best, the Nation is to have a sort of pale privilege of post-audit on the President's decisions. "The people," Cutler generously says, "may always call him to an accounting, for his acts and omissions to act."

The italics are Cutler's, and if you read his speech, you will wonder why he did not also capitalize the words "him" and "his." He has need to believe that the President possesses divine attributes; for none but a president-deity could accommodate the Cutler system and the American system.

OUR SYSTEM, although Cutler forgets it, happens to be a democracy. In a democracy, the people are the masters; and even such high officials as the secretary of the Security Council and the President, himself, are the people's servants. And any democratic government will surely fail if its masters, the people, are successfully kept in the dark about the national situation.

The facts that Cutler would withhold from the people, on the ground that they are classified, are almost all the facts which define the national situation of this Republic. Such problems as the relative status of our own defense effort and the Soviet defense effort now have as much bearing on our national situation as the existence of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; and maybe they have more bearing. And if the Cutler recipe is followed in a free society—and the Administration is going to any lengths to follow that system—three things automatically happen.

First, the society is automatically crippled because the people do not know the challenges that confront them, and therefore do not rise to meet those challenges.

Second, the society is crippled

in another way, too. The official leadership starts whining that the "people won't stand for" doing the necessary things, whose necessity they, themselves, have hidden from the people.

Third, the temptation to cover up failures, instead of correcting them, becomes altogether irresistible to the leaders. For it is ridiculous to talk to the people about "holding the President accountable for his acts and omissions to act" when the people are being thoroughly and continuously bamboozled, and bamboozlement is established high policy.

ALL THREE of these results of the Cutler system are already beginning to appear in America. They must inevitably add up, in the end, to a kind of creeping national paralysis in the face of the deadly dangers of our times. And for what purpose, one asks, are we risking national paralysis by withholding the truth from our people?

For no purpose whatever, is the ironical answer. For even Cutler has not dared to suggest that we sacrifice the outward trappings of a free society, our budget is still public. The locations of our war plants, the patterns of our urban centers, all our new starts in industry, are not yet hidden matters. A great flood of technical publications will tell any subscriber who wishes to purchase them the current state of our military-industrial progress. And from these and other public sources, the Soviet intelligence is able to deduce with ease all those facts Cutler and others like him would hide from our people.

In short, the Cutler system, which is also the Eisenhower Administration system, is not merely antidemocratic. Worse still, it is plain silly, unless its real purpose is to prevent those political embarrassments which officials of all governments have always wished to avoid.

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Matter of Fact By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

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Date: JUN 15 1955

55 JUN 21 1955

Matter of Fact

Symptoms of Censorship Malady

By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

IN THE LANGUAGE of the psychiatrists, the Eisenhower Administration is now suffering from a severe censorship syndrome. The worst sufferer seems to be the President himself. The resulting loss of contact with democratic reality is only too easy to prove.

Not long ago, for instance, the President complained long and loudly at a National Security Council meeting because the Defense Department had published pictures of launching sites of the Nike guided missile. Yet any kid with a Brownie camera can go out to Arlington and take the same pictures.

Again, the President has told the able Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Trevor Gardner, to go and stand in a corner because of a speech about the Air Force's Falcon missile. Yet the speech contained no fact that had not been previously published, and it had even been given the most elaborate clearance by the new American chief censor, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson.

Or again, the Civil Defense agency was shockingly obstructed and the American people were kept in dangerous ignorance for more than a year by Adm. Lewis E. Strauss' suppression of the facts concerning radioactive fallout from the H-bomb. Yet, all these facts were fully known to the Soviets even before they were learned by Adm. Strauss.

IN A REMARKABLE PIECE for the New York Herald Tribune, Walter Kerr has tried hard to explain this seemingly inexplicable urge to keep from the American people even those facts that the enemy quite surely knows.

Explanations were sought from Defense Department Information Chief Herschel Schooley; from U. S. Information Agency Chief Theodore Streibert; and from R. C. Honami, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense who has the special task of hiding the life-and-death facts of their national situation from the American people.

The official rationalization of the President's desire to keep the people in the dark was summarized as follows by Kerr:

"The President recognizes (that) many items of military information . . . become known to the military tacticians of other countries—of Russia for example. He believes, however, that these technicians are unable to influence their country's top officials. (Their information) is buried in a report and forgotten . . .

"Then, the reasoning goes, the same information . . . is released to the American press. It is widely published. It is commented on at length . . . Soon the item which was originally

technical is no longer technical. It has political significance. It comes to the attention of political leaders. Then, and perhaps only then, the Soviet leader . . . translates into action a technical proposal that had been safely buried."

ACCORDING TO THOSE who have worked intimately with the President on the censorship problem, these interesting statements, genuinely represent the Eisenhower viewpoint. As a description of Soviet planning methods, they are of course inaccurate to the point of being downright alarming.

They are directly refuted, in fact, by the whole history of Soviet military technology from the T-34 tank to the new heavy bomber.

In the last 20 years, all-out development of all the brilliantly successful Soviet new weapons produced in this period was quite certainly started before readers of the American press or any other press had heard about such weapons. The fact is proved by the development times, unless you prefer to assume that Soviet engineers are ten times quicker than American engineers.

On the other hand, the President's theory of Soviet behavior is highly applicable to the behavior of his own Administration. As so often happens when syndromes are serious, there has been a transference of symptoms.

The Eisenhower Administration, not the Soviet government, has the habit of ignoring technicians' warnings until they cease to be technical and become political because of publicity.

THAT WAS MOST recently proven by the true story of the Moscow overflights, previously told in this space. Long before the overflights, the technicians had been warning that we were lagging behind the Soviets in air development. But the warnings were ignored until the overflights occurred, the attempted censorship failed, and the facts became known.

After that, our lag in air development was a political issue, and corrective action was taken.

Such incidents, in turn, reveal the roots of the censorship syndrome. It is rooted, obviously, in the Administration's eagerness to cut taxes, balance the budget and do other popular things. The people are not to be told the life-and-death facts because the facts would stir up the people to demand necessary Defense Department spending, which would in turn make the Treasury Department program harder to carry out.

Unfortunately, however, the diagnosis of the disease does not make the symptoms more attractive or the disease less dangerous. (Copyright, 1955, New York Herald Tribune, Inc.)

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Date: JUN 12 1955

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Matter of Fact . . . By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

How the Censorship Works

In FREE societies, great political changes at least deserve to be publicly debated. But the Eisenhower Administration has been trying to introduce a strict peacetime censorship in America by methods that are neither forthright nor above ground.

The thing hardly came into the open at all, in fact, until Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson's extraordinary "bat-ten-all-hatches" order at the Pentagon. But long before Secretary Wilson told his generals and admirals they must never give the American people any uncomfortable life-and-death facts, the effort to keep those facts from the people already was in full swing.

The reason why the effort has got and is getting so little notice is extremely simple. Reporters are rightly taught not to write about themselves. And the main point of impact of this novel American censorship is in the sensitive area of the relations between newspapermen and Government officials.

How the thing works is simple enough. A reporter obtains and publishes nationally significant information about, say, the grave lag of the American air program behind the Soviet air program. He has seen no secret papers. He has written nothing which was not already fully known to the Soviet intelligence. He has merely posed a major public issue, with a vital bearing on the Nation's future.

Nowadays, however, even the most trivial information has been classified by someone or other, in some dim Pentagon corner or other. Furthermore, the reporter has given no pleasure whatever in high quarters, by posing this major public issue which the leaders of the Administration had been hoping to keep under the rug. So a "security investigation" is ordered.

THE FACT THAT a reporter is the subject of one of

these security investigations does not mean for one moment that he has broken the law. Even less does it mean there is the slightest danger of prosecution. Attorney General Herbert Brownell has sometimes had the crude gall to hint of prosecutions at cocktail parties, but he has far too much worldly sense to carry out his threats. The security investigation, in truth, is nothing but a kind of indirect reprisal against the reporter who shows inconvenient curiosity about facts of national interest.

The reprisal takes three forms. First, while the investigation goes on the reporter must assume that his telephones are tapped and that listening devices may be planted in his house and office. The Federal flatfoot deny that they indulge in these Gestapo-like practices, but the denials are singularly unconvincing.

Second, the reporter's official acquaintances and friends are subjected to the most shameless harassment. It does not matter whether there is a tittle of evidence that they are the source of the reporter's information. It does not even matter if it is well known that they have never discussed the subject in question with the offending reporter. The real object is not to locate the reporter's source, but simply to strike at the reporter through the men he knows in Government.

Then third and finally, the word is passed in Government that the offending reporter lies under the grave displeasure of the powers that be; and that it is therefore a risky thing to see him. Thus the attempt is made to prevent the reporter from doing his job as a reporter thereafter.

The attempt has never yet been absolutely successful. These reporters have had at least five, and it may now be six of these security investigations. But we think we still

get our fair share of the news. So do James Reston of the New York Times, Chalmers M. Roberts of the Washington Post and Times Herald and the other well known Washington correspondents who have experienced the same charming attentions from their Government.

BUT WHILE INDIVIDUAL reporters can still barely manage to do their jobs in Washington, the new censorship is already successful in the larger sense there are good reasons to believe, for example, that Secretary Wilson's 1953 defense cuts actually crippled the development of our more advanced aircraft models; and so these cuts left the United States with no adequate answer to the new planes the Soviets have just shown.

But whether this is true or not, is an inordinately complicated question involving many different factors. The fate of America may perhaps depend upon the truth. It is quite possible that a real crash program is now needed, to repair the 1953 mistakes; and such a program will certainly not be ordered without public pressure. And since the question is so complicated, and the whole present aim of the Administration is to cover up the facts, the full facts that are needed to convince the public may be all but impossible to obtain.

Then again, no sensible reporter enjoys the highly unpleasant experience of having the local Gestapo on his trail. He thinks twice, he hesitates and sometimes he decides not to publish, when he knows the publication of a piece of news will anger the powers that be. And so these reporters have issued to their readers a censorship warning, meaning that the news from Washington is now seriously slanted by the Administration's effort to conceal life-and-death facts.

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Date: JUN 13 1955

5:3 JUN 27 1955

Matter of Fact By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

Censorship Warning

FOR A GREAT many years, American correspondents in Moscow have wisely warned that their own dispatches are slanted, because of the Soviet censorship. In the opinion of these reporters, it is now time for Washington correspondents to send out a similar warning.

This being peacetime, the Eisenhower Administration is not yet using the conventional blue pencils. Yet this Administration is practicing a widespread censorship, which is no less effective in slanting the news because it is insidiously indirect.

The censor's pressure is felt by every Washington reporter who still bothers to wear out his shoe leather to do his real job—which is to transmit facts of vital national meaning to the American public.

Facts of really vital meaning are precisely the facts that are now under interdict. And the stage has now been reached where honest reporters really have a duty to confess this novel pressure.

As an example of the sort of thing that is now a matter of course; consider the curious episode that led these reporters to the rather grave decision to give a censorship warning. It happened not very long ago, when one of us had just returned from a six months' trip in Asia.

AFTER THIS long absence, two of these reporters' best and oldest friends in Washington proposed a happy family reunion. The ladies of the three families laid agreeable plans. The logistics of the party, although somewhat elaborate, were smoothly completed. And then, on the very eve of the reunion, there was a somewhat embarrassed telephone call.

Messrs A and B, as we may

call our two old friends, both hold high posts in the same Government agency. They had been bluntly told that their official positions would be compromised if the party were held as planned.

Behind this extraordinary episode, there was another no less extraordinary. During that week, we had published a report on the problem of an American satellite. The Soviets have already announced their intention to build an earth-satellite, and have placed their leading physicist, Peter Kapitza, in charge of the project. For this and other obvious reasons, the satellite problem seemed to us reasonably fateful, and therefore we felt it was in the public domain.

This view was not held, however, by the National Security Council. That Thursday's NSC's meeting turned, apparently, into a prolonged outburst of righteous indignation. Here, once again, the American people were being told facts of the utmost national importance—but facts which the NSC wanted to cover up.

IT DID NOT matter of course, that these reporters had had no access whatever to classified information. That point was not even tested. The chief of the agency that employs Messrs. A and B had been at the NSC meeting. Without further ado, he returned to his office and issued the edict that led, in turn, to the embarrassed telephoned call already noted. He did this, moreover, with a full understanding of the rules that have always governed our friendship with Messrs. A and B.

We have never talked to these friends of ours about their work in their agency, or indeed about any "sensitive" matters. This has always been understood between us. In present-day Washington, which is more zoo than metropolis, wise men keep business and friendship strictly separated. If any official is your friend, and you feel you must discuss public questions

with him, you ask formally for an appointment, and you go formally to his office.

You do not talk business at family reunions. And you do not talk business, either, with very old and valued friends whose official duties are genuinely not in the public domain.

The agency chief knew of these rules. He told Messrs. A and B, and he later told these reporters, that he was confident the rules had always been and would always be strictly enforced. He did not fear any improper disclosure. But he greatly feared the attack that would develop on his agency, if it became known that important subordinates of his dared to continue an old friendship with persons who dared to write about facts of the highest national importance.

NO DOUBT HE was right. He had observed the scene at the NSC meeting. He is one of the finest men in Washington. He and Messrs. A and B had no course open to them, in the circumstances, except to put the welfare of their agency first.

What is not right, however, is the mephitic, the almost psychotic atmosphere that forces this kind of invasion of private life, to carry out reprisals against reporters who are doing what they conceive to be their public duty. What is not right, either, is this indirect censorship by reprisal which is now being carried so far that reporters who still do their jobs must expect any kind of harassment, from old-fashioned security investigations to separation from their oldest friends and quite probably wire-tapping and bug-planting.

What is involved here, in fact, is a radical change in the American political system, and very nearly an amendment to the American Constitution, that is being shoved through behind the backs of the American people. And this is so serious a matter that it will be the subject of several subsequent reports.

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
Oppenheimer Case Transcript Really Spills the Beans

BY JOSEPH AND STEWART ALSOP

WASHINGTON—The end is not yet, in the tragic case of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. Now that Washington officialdom has digested the massive transcript released by the Atomic Energy Commission, there is grave and widespread worry about the many breaches of security that the transcript contains.

Among those reliably reported to be actually disturbed is the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission's own general advisory committee, the brilliant Dr. I. I. Rabi.

In the Pentagon, too, and especially in the Air Force, (which is most intimately affected) the release of the Oppenheimer transcript is re-



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BY JOSEPH AND STEWART ALSOP

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In the Pentagon, too, and especially in the Air Force, (which is most intimately affected) the release of the Oppenheimer transcript is regarded as the most wholesale disclosure of secret matter in a very long time.



Joseph



Stewart

THE RELEASE of the transcript has done the following things:

1—Revealed the existence of the hitherto top secret Air Force project, AFOAT I, for long range detection of Soviet atomic and thermonuclear explosions. This pinpoints the operational setup of our long range detection system.

2—Revealed that our scientific analysts have found the air sample the most reliable of the several available methods of long range detection, and disclosed that our analysts know the precise character of the Soviet bombs listed thus far.

3—Revealed a multitude of never published facts allowing detailed reconstruction of the basic recommendations of the VISTA Report, also hitherto top secret, including VISTA's controversial Chapter Five. And this is especially interesting. For Chapter Five of the VISTA Report led the then Gen. Eisenhower to make important modifications in his strategy of West European defense, and these modifications still guide the thinking at SHAPE.

4—Revealed many vital details, also hitherto secret, about the famous LINCOLN study of continental air defense, together with some supplementary data on LINCOLN'S predecessor, Project CHARLES.

5—Revealed the exact timing of the vital discovery by Dr. Edwin Teller, which revolutionized the whole hydrogen bomb project. This lets the Soviet intelligence pinpoint the moment when our H-bomb project really got going, and so gives Soviet analysts the perfect base on which to calculate our H-bomb stockpile.

6—Revealed certain other data that the Soviet intelligence officers can quite probably put together with their own air samples, and so infer the exact nature of this discovery of Dr. Teller's, which is the main theme of our H-bomb technology.

BY ANY standard, these are massive revelations. What is much worse, however, is what the intelligence analysts call the "totality" of the picture that the Oppenheimer transcript paints.

In this document, for the first time, you find the exact course of the most secret arguments, the precise climate of the highest official opinion, all the complex shadings of viewpoint and approach, as to several of America's most vital strategic problems.

This totality of disclosure really must be beyond price for the Kremlin. For it permits the most difficult of all intelligence feats—an accurate assessment of enemy intention.

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(REPORTERS)

SEN. KARL E. MUNDT (R-S.D.) SAID THE ARMY-MCCARTHY SUBCOMMITTEE WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO FORCE ANY NEWSMAN-WITNESS TO DIVULGE THE SOURCES OF ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED ON THE ROW.

MUNDT'S ANSWER WAS GIVEN IN RESPONSE TO WHAT HE INSISTED WAS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.

IT WAS ASKED BY A REPORTER WHO ASKED WHY ONE NEWSMAN, QUESTIONED IN SECRET BY THE PERMANENT INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE, HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO NAME THE SOURCE OF SOME INFORMATION.

AT LEAST TWO NEWSMEN HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED SECRETLY BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE. ONE HAS BEEN PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED AS JOSEPH ALSOP, SYNDICATED COLUMNIST OF THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE.

THE NEW YORK TIMES SAID TODAY SUBCOMMITTEE SOURCES HAD IDENTIFIED THE OTHER AS JAMES RESTON, THE TIMES' WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT.

MUNDT TOLD NEWSMEN "I CAN ASSURE YOU" THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE WOULD NOT HOLD IT NECESSARY TO DIVULGE ANY INFORMATION SOURCES "IF ANY OF YOU ARE CALLED."

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MATTER OF FACT

By STEWART ALSOP

The Night Avon Laughed

AVON, Conn.

It is better to say at the outset that this is going to be a rather personal report, since it concerns Avon, Conn., the small New England town where this reporter was born and brought up. The most stirring event in the history of Avon took place a few days ago in the auditorium of the Towpath School.

My father, who was Republican first selectman of Avon for thirty-five years, for a long time strongly opposed the building of the Towpath School. He said it would cost too much money. When it was pointed out that the old school was a firetrap, my father replied that it was a low building, and in case of fire the children would jump out the windows if they had any sense.

But in the end the new school was built (at vast expense to the taxpayers, as my father had predicted). Last Thursday night, 350 of the town's registered Republican voters met in the school's modern auditorium to vote on a resolution reaffirming support for Dwight D. Eisenhower, and sharply repudiating Joseph R. McCarthy.

As Avon's Republicans gathered in the auditorium, there was the traditional neighborly chat, sometimes disconcertingly frank, after the New England manner ("Why, Stewart, I just didn't recognize you—your face sure has fleshed up."). There was also a certain tension, unusual in an Avon Republican caucus. The fact is that when three Republican town committeemen, Phil Bauer, Bob August and my brother John Alsop, drafted the anti-McCarthy resolution, they didn't know what they were getting in for.

It would be too much to say that Avon became a center of national attention. But the nation at least caught a glimpse of Avon out of the corner of its eye, for the first time in Avon's long history—and Avon is not used to Klieg lights and television cameras. Moreover—incredible as it may seem in these days of careful political stage-managing—no one knew what might happen. My brother John thought it quite possible that the resolution would be beaten.

He led off with a masterful speech, clearly challenging—or so it seemed to me—Sir Winston Churchill's claim to supremacy in the field of oratory. His theme was the preamble to the resolution: "We deplore and vigorously denounce Sen. McCarthy's methods and, what is more, we sincerely question his motives and objectives. We are convinced that his activities are placing the Eisenhower program in jeopardy and damaging the reputation of the Republican party. We believe that Avon's

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Republicans are in agreement with us."

My brother was ably seconded by Bauer and August, and then it was the turn of the town's leading McCarthyite, Fiske Ventres. Fiske is a pleasant-mannered man with an owlish face. Like John, he once represented Avon in the State Assembly. He made a pretty good speech of its kind.

His theme was that "the Army brass has been awfully blind to the Communist menace" and that only McCarthy could prevent America "being sold down the river to the Russians." He spoke with passionate conviction, and the speech was going over rather well until Fiske made a fatal mistake. "Sen. McCarthy and President Eisenhower," he said, "are working hand in hand."

This remark was greeted with a roar of good-natured laughter, as sweet and sane a sound as this reporter has heard for a long, long time. That laugh was the turning point. When Fiske ended his speech, there was polite applause, some more desultory discussion, and then Avon's Republicans voted for the resolution, 350 to 1.

Does this vote mean anything?

My brother John thinks that it means a lot. "A while back," he says, "McCarthy had a lot of support in Avon, and now, almost over night, this support seems to have crumbled away." Avon is a typical farming-manufacturing-commuting small town. Perhaps Herbert Brucker, wise editor of "The Hartford Courant," was right when he remarked to my brother: "It's another case of the people being way ahead of the politicians." At any rate, throughout the evening of the caucus, I kept thinking of my father, who had presided over so many Republican caucuses in his thirty-five years as Avon's first selectman. My father was a conservative if there ever was one. He abominated the New Deal and never could see any good reason for labor unions. But he also despised sham and cheap trickery, and he loved the old unspoken traditions of Avon, and of America—the traditions of free choice, and friendliness, and simple, open-hearted tolerance.

For these reasons, before he died last spring, my father had come to despise Joe McCarthy and everything he stood for, perhaps the more bitterly because McCarthy called himself a Republican. My father would have disliked the Klieg lights and the ruckus but, if he had been present in the auditorium of the Towpath School the other night, I think he would have been proud of Avon.

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Matter of Fact

The Can Get Jump on McCarthy

By Stewart Alsop

PRESIDENT-ELECT Eisenhower is being urged by Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge and other wise advisers to seize the initiative on the Communist issue at the very outset of his Administration. He is being advised to appoint, as soon as possible, a nonpartisan commission modeled on the Canadian Royal Commission which broke the Canadian spy ring. This commission would have full access to the facts, would study these facts in secret and in detail, and would then issue a sober, nonpolitical report on internal subversion to the President and the country.

One reason Eisenhower is being urged to take this course is that otherwise Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy and his imitators will seize the initiative. McCarthy's next step is rather obvious. For a couple of years, McCarthy has been loudly demanding the security files on Government employees. He will now almost inevitably take the line that Eisenhower, as a good Republican, should accede to this demand which was refused by President Truman.

Eisenhower's choice, as between the proposed nonpartisan commission and a McCarthy field day with the files, is a matter of the utmost importance to the future of the Eisenhower Administration. To understand why, it is necessary to understand what these famous files really are.

ANY INDIVIDUAL who has taken a Government job, particularly in a sensitive agency, is security-checked in great detail by the FBI and also in most cases by the security branch of his own agency. Security agents interview large numbers of people who have known him, or known something about him, in the past.

These people are assured that their identities will be kept secret from the individual under investigation. What they say is included verbatim in the "raw files," which are what McCarthy wants to get his hands on.

Often the security agents collect some information which is based on personal enmity, or sheer malice, or simple stupidity. In the raw files of one able Government employee, for example, a source is quoted as describing him as a dangerous radical. Subsequent investigation revealed that this charge was based on the fact that the employee, a Vermonter, had actively supported Vermont's liberal Republican Senator, George Aiken.

A woman employee was recently asked to answer a similar charge of radicalism. It

turned out that a former pupil had testified that she was "immature" in her 20s and "too sympathetic to new ideas." It is no fault of the security agents that many reports of radicalism or subversion turn out to be utterly false. It is their job simply to report what they are told; as FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover has often said, it is no business of the FBI to interpret or assess the information it collects.

YET IT IS EASY to see what use McCarthy and his imitators could make of material from the raw files. One can almost hear McCarthy: "I have in my hand an official report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation," and so on. He would use the raw files to "prove" what he has conspicuously failed to prove heretofore—that the American Government is crawling with spies.

If McCarthy is given a free hand with the files, he will certainly have a stick with which to beat the dead horse of the Truman Administration, but he will also undermine the Eisenhower Administration in the process. He can do this in three ways.

First, as Eisenhower has said, he wants and needs really able public servants in all echelons of the Government. But, despite McCarthy's kind words about John Foster Dulles, good men are going to hesitate to serve in the State Department, for example, which is McCarthy's favorite target when any personal enemy or malicious tale-bearer can blacken their names in perfect safety via McCarthy.

Second, political use of the raw files will undermine internal security procedures. That is why J. Edgar Hoover has consistently opposed opening the files. Finally, the surrender to McCarthy of a vital executive prerogative in the matter of the files of the executive branch would be taken as a green light for McCarthy and all his imitators. The confidence of the country in the integrity and loyalty of Government servants, already badly shaken, would then soon be destroyed in the McCarthy circus which would ensue.

The nonpartisan commission proposed by Lodge and others would be designed to restore confidence in the Government. It is not, of course, a new idea. The same thing was proposed to Truman, and Truman's rejection of the idea was a tremendous bonanza for McCarthy. Eisenhower is certainly well aware that McCarthy is no more his friend than he was Truman's friend, and being the kind of man he is, Eisenhower is not likely to repeat Truman's mistake.

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Matter of Fact

Both Parties Sniff at Civil Rights

By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

THE WAY both major parties are sniffing nervously at the civil rights issue provides the least edifying spectacle of this campaign. The candidates have got to decide soon just how badly they need the Negro vote, and just how far they will go to get it.

President Truman himself has often said privately that the Negroes gave him the margin of victory in 1948, by voting for him in sufficient numbers to provide his slim majorities in Illinois, Ohio and California. According to the Negro leaders, Negroes feel even more deeply about the civil rights issue this year than in 1948, and more of them will go to the polls than ever before. There are more than three million in the key Northern States which could go either way, including more than half a million in New York, more than a third of a million in Illinois and Pennsylvania, and well over 200,000 each in Ohio, Michigan, California and Maryland.

The way Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adlai E. Stevenson deal with the civil rights issue could obviously determine the outcome of a close election. Eisenhower's pre-convention campaign manager, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge (Mass.), and his allies are trying to persuade Eisenhower to reverse himself on the issue. Although Eisenhower has flatly said that he opposes compulsory Federal fair employment legislation, the Lodge group is willing to risk a public flipflop by their candidate, because they think it will pay off in November.

Lodge and his allies are clearly much more worried than they were in the pre-convention period, when there was talk of an Eisenhower sweep which would carry Southern Democratic States like Texas. An Eisenhower switch on civil rights would knock out his chance of winning Southern electoral votes. But Lodge now considers it much more important for Eisenhower to have a solid chance to carry the key Northern industrial States, where the Negro vote is concentrated, rather than an outside chance of winning a scattering of Southern States.

Moreover, the Lodge group is convinced that the Democratic nomination for Vice President of Sen. John Sparkman of Alabama gives the Republicans a real opportunity to recapture the bulk of the Negro vote. Since he was visited a few days ago by a Negro delegation, Eisenhower seems to be thinking of taking Lodge's advice. But after what he has already said on the subject, it will not be easy for Eisenhower to reverse himself.

EISENHOWER'S running mate, Sen. Richard Nixon (Calif.), moreover, has repeatedly

voted with the Southerners on civil rights issues. He has opposed cloture, and on the Senate's labor subcommittee which was considering the Humphrey-Ives employment bill, Nixon joined Sen. Lister Hill of Alabama in opposing the bill. Thus, the Republican vice presidential candidate would have to do a public flipflop too.

The curious fact is that Stevenson's problem is easier than Eisenhower's, despite the presence of Sparkman on the ticket. For the time being, Stevenson has played down the civil rights issue. Meanwhile, many Southern leaders, like Sen. Richard Russell of Georgia, Sen. A. Willis Robertson of Virginia, Gov. Hugh L. White of Mississippi, and the last into the fold, Gov. James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, are declaring for Stevenson. Stevenson electors will appear on the ballots on these and other Southern States.

With the South thus tidied up, Stevenson will then be in a position to make a speech firmly favoring Federal civil rights legislation, and interpreting the Democratic civil rights plank as stronger than the 1948 plank. This is the strategy which some of those close to him are urging Stevenson to adopt. It would have been easier for Stevenson to do so effectively, if the "liberals" at the Chicago convention had not gone a trifle mad. They made a funny issue of the seating of the Virginia and Louisiana delegations, talked about Stevenson as a "Northern Dixiecrat," and pictured Sparkman as a sort of Simon Legree.

Since it is no secret that Stevenson encouraged the nomination of Sparkman, whom he admires for his generally liberal record, this public spasm of the liberals in Chicago certainly complicates his problem. It makes it much easier for the Republicans to picture any strong civil rights stand by Stevenson as mere cynical vote hunting.

This could hurt Stevenson with the Negro voters, especially because there has already been so much stomach-turning political cynicism where their civil rights are concerned. The Southern oligarchs have seized on the civil rights issue to maintain themselves in power. Many of the Northerners have used the issue as a sort of political flypaper, shouting for unenforceable legislation which they know has no chance of passing, in order to catch Negro votes. Under these circumstances, it is just possible that the best strategy for both Eisenhower and Stevenson is to say what they really think. And being the kind of men they are, it is also possible that this is precisely what they will do.

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BUDENZ LIED, JOSEPH ALSOP TELLS INQUIRY

Joseph Alsop, New York Herald Tribune columnist frequently used as a State department propagandist, told the Senate internal security committee yesterday that Louis Budenz, Fordham university professor, was a perjurer.

Budenz, former high Communist official who repented in 1945 and rejoined the Catholic church, was the government's chief witness at the trial which led to the conviction, upheld by the Supreme court, of 11 Communist party leaders.

Budenz aroused Alsop's ire when he testified before the Senate

committee that former Vice President Wallace on a mission to China in 1944 was guided by the Communist influence of Owen Lattimore and John C. Vincent. Lattimore at the time was an office of war information official assigned by President Roosevelt to accompany Wallace. Vincent was then chief of the China division of the State department.

Alsop testified that he was an aide to Gen. Chennault when Wallace reached China and himself helped to advise Wallace during his stay there.

To prove his point that Budenz testified falsely, Alsop argued that Wallace had recommended the recall of the American commander in China, Gen. Stilwell, whose pro-Communist sympathies were well-known, and the substitution of Gen. Wedemeyer.

Instead of carrying out a Communist objective, therefore, Alsop contended, Wallace recommended an action "precisely contrary" to Communist interests. Since Vincent participated in the recom-

mendation, Vincent was not a Communist, he asserted. No mention was made of Lattimore.

Thru a long day, in which thousands of words were poured into the record, committee members argued with Alsop over whether the Wallace mission had achieved results beneficial to the Chinese Communists or otherwise.

Committee counsel J. G. Sourwine elicited from Alsop the admission that he had no direct knowledge of the Communist party line at the time and no direct knowledge whether Vincent was a Communist or not.

Near the end, Alsop apologized to the committee for writing columns in which he intimated that the committee had encouraged Budenz to commit perjury. He was in error, he said, and withdrew

this insinuation. But he maintained that Budenz, "now close to being a professional informer," had deliberately "misled" the committee.

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Alsop Accuses Rudenz Of Misrepresentation

Columnist Joseph Alsop yesterday swore that Louis Rudenz gave "a farrago of distortions and misrepresentations" in charging that Henry A. Wallace's 1944 trip to China carried out Communist ends.

"The overwhelming weight of evidence," Alsop told the Senate Internal Security subcommittee, "in my opinion, indicates he (Rudenz) has lied."

Alsop suggested that the Justice Department should be asked to consider the testimony Rudenz gave the subcommittee at two hearings, to determine if any action should be taken on it. Alsop first challenged the Rudenz testimony in his newspaper columns. Testifying yesterday at his own request in a tense all-day session, Alsop repeatedly met objections that his testimony constituted "opinion" and "theory."

Cites the Evidence

He protested that there was "a mass of evidence" to disprove Rudenz, whose own evidence was "wholly unsupported."

While former Communist Rudenz had testified the Communists in 1944 were "pleased" with the results of the Wallace mission, Alsop termed it "the heaviest blow to the Communist cause in China that could possibly be struck at that time."

Alsop set out to disprove the

Rudenz testimony that Wallace, accompanied by John Carter Vincent of the State Department and Owen Lattimore, then an Office of War Information official, carried out a "Communist objective"; that Vincent "guided" Wallace along Communist lines, or that Vincent was a Communist.

He introduced extensive documentation bearing on the mission and policy in China.

"Opinion," Says Watkins

At the conclusion of the session, however, Sen. Arthur V. Watkins (R-Utah), appeared to voice the view of other subcommittee members when he said:

"It seems to me from what you have said that is largely opinion evidence."

Alsop, in 1944, was on the staff of Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, Air Force commander in China and a vigorous anti-Communist.

While only a lieutenant at the time, Alsop helped Wallace and Vincent draft a report to the White House which called for the replacement of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell as American commander in the Far East, and recommended Lieut. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer to succeed him.

Stilwell's recall, said Alsop, constituted a major blow to the Communists, for while Stil-

well was "a passionately loyal American" he was also "an invaluable, an incalculable, an irreplaceable asset to the Chinese Communists."

Under intensive questioning

by attorneys Robert Morris and J. G. Sourwine, Alsop said that while two stories from the Communist's Daily Worker classed Wedemeyer's replacement of Stilwell as a good "compromise,"

other items in that paper show an entirely different view.

He said they showed the Communists were "horrified and downcast by Stilwell's dismissal," and the newspaper showed a "mixed reaction" to an accomplished fact when it was "caught with its party line down." More important, he said, was the party position when the Wallace recommendations were made four months earlier.

Vincent Favored Chennault

Before Vincent joined in the recommendation for Wedemeyer to replace Stilwell, said Alsop, Vincent had agreed with Wallace to urge Chennault for the post, but Alsop argued against it on Chennault's behalf.

Rudenz, Alsop pointed out, testified that "The Communists were very much opposed to General Chennault and didn't want him in the picture at all."

"This was the way," said Alsop wryly, "that the accused Mr. Vincent, 'guided' Mr. Wallace along the paths of the party line."

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Matter Of Fact

By Joseph and Stewart

Also

The Young Gentlemen

THE OTHER DAY a new experience—a visit from the FBI—came to these reporters. It was a surprisingly sociable, indeed a downright genial meeting. The two agents representing the bureau were decent, intelligent young men. They neither blustered nor talked nonsense. A shrewd but friendly inquisition merged, almost insensibly, into a friendly parting. Nothing could have been more painless.

In the background of this jolly chat, however, lurking, as it were, behind the curtain of amiability that enclosed the conversation, there were one or two things that were decidedly disagreeable to think about.

To be specific, the misdeed being investigated was no sinister subversive activity. It was the publication of the proof that the Soviet atomic explosion was the planned explosion of a workable atomic bomb, and the disclosure of the best estimates available of the stock of atomic bombs accumulated by the Kremlin since the seismographs picked up the earthquake in central Siberia. This was the crime that led President Truman to order a "security investigation." It would have been more fitting to investigate why the leaders of this Nation failed to impart such vital information to the American people on their own initiative.

THE TWENTY or thirty bombs now in the possession of the Kremlin, the 100 or more atomic bombs the Kremlin will have in another 18 months, are not after all pretty baubles by Faberge. Their mere existence intimately, directly and deeply affects the world position of the United States, the future of the free world, the individual future of every American citizen. Their existence, in short, is one of the three or four salient facts that must influence every decision of national policy.

In Russia, no doubt, such knowledge may be closely guarded. But ours is a free society, whose masters are the people of the United States. The great decisions of national policy are made by the people, and not by the President, or the Secretary of State, or any other temporary officeholder. In order to decide wisely, the people must be informed. And it is the most sacred trust, the most important single duty, of the highest public servants to inform their masters, the people, so that the decisions of the people may be wise.

As Winston Churchill brilliantly proved, facts which are matters of life and death can always be presented honestly to the people, even in circumstances of great delicacy and danger, without giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Suppression of such facts is not a sign of prudence. It is a sign of leadership that is feeble, or dishonest, or both.

If the leaders wish to represent a disastrous program of disarmament as "cutting fat without muscle"; if they desire to bemuse the people about the meaning of such a great event as the Soviet atomic explosion; if they are pretending that the chances "were never better for peace" with Korea just around the corner, it is only natural for everything to be classified except the toilet paper. Such is the rule that has been followed in Washington, more or less consistently, for the past two years.

In these circumstances, it becomes the duty of every self-respecting reporter to dig out, not any facts which are properly secret, but the essential facts which affect the national posture and welfare. It is a risky business; for reporters and editors cannot know what is known to Presidents and Secretaries of State—exactly how to present these vital facts so that no harm is done. But if the press lets itself be transformed into a mere machine for transmitting the doctored handouts of shabby politicians, the press has abdicated its chief function.

There are other points besides the foregoing that are raised by the recent visit of the young men from the FBI. A whole chapter might be written on the shocking but increasing use of these "security investigations," not only as a weapon to muzzle the press, but as a weapon of inter-departmental bureaucratic war.

ANOTHER CHAPTER might be devoted to the methods used—the broadside inquiry which in these reporters' experience at least never hits the target; the wholesale harassment of innocent men on the method of "who knows whom"; the unashamed official practice of the very same guilt-by-association which is considered so shocking when indulged in by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. Something more might even be said about the scrupulosity of the FBI as compared with the State Department's special agents, who have done things in the past two years that must have made Secretary of State Acheson's great master, Mr. Justice Holmes, turn in his honored grave.

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But there is no space here to go slumming in these purlieus of the American Government. The point here is very simple indeed. In a free society, secrecy is not security. National ignorance is the shortest road to national annihilation. And this "security investigation" caused by the publication of information most vital to the national future shows how great is the confusion and the danger.

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Matter Of Fact

By Joseph and Stewart

Alsup

The Young Gentlemen

THE OTHER DAY a new experience—a visit from the FBI—came to these reporters. It was a surprisingly sociable, indeed a downright genial meeting. The two agents representing the bureau were decent, intelligent young men. They neither blustered nor talked nonsense. A shrewd but friendly inquisition merged, almost insensibly, into a friendly parting. Nothing could have been more painless.

In the background, of this jolly chat, however, lurking, as it were, behind the curtain of amiability that enclosed the conversation, there were one or two things that were decidedly disagreeable to think about.

To be specific, the misdeed being investigated was no sinister subversive activity. It was the publication of the proof that the Soviet atomic explosion was the planned explosion of a workable atomic bomb, and the disclosure of the best estimates available of the stock of atomic bombs accumulated by the Kremlin since the seismographs picked up the earthquake in central Siberia. This was the crime that led President Truman to order a "security investigation." It would have been more fitting to investigate why the leaders of this Nation failed to impart such vital information to the American people on their own initiative.

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ADD 2 ALSOP

MCCARRAN, WHO ARRIVED AT THE HEARING AFTER IT HAD BEGUN, OBJECTED TO THE METHOD OF ALSOP'S PRESENTATION. ALSOP SAID THAT COUNSEL SOURWINE HAD APPROVED HIS SPEAKING "FROM NOTES." THE COLUMNIST URGED THE SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS TO INTERRUPT HIM IF THEY WISHED.

MORRIS, HOWEVER, ASKED THAT THE RECORD SHOW THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF HAD NEVER SEEN THE DOCUMENTS WHICH ALSOP OFFERED BEFORE HE PRESENTED THEM. MCCARRAN TOLD ALSOP THAT HE WANTED TO KNOW WHO IS "RUNNING" THE SUBCOMMITTEE, BUT HE ALLOWED THE WITNESS TO PROCEED.

ALSOP CONTENDED THAT, AT THE TIME THE WALLACE MISSION ARRIVED IN CHINA, STILWELL WAS ACTUALLY PLANNING TO GIVE "PRACTICAL EFFECT" TO HIS PREFERENCE FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY MACHINE.

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WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

Testimony of Budenz Is 'Grossly Distorted,' Alsop Tells Senators

By Robert K. Walsh

Joseph Alsop, accused Louis Budenz before a Senate subcommittee today of "gross distortion and deception" in testimony about asserted Communist influence on former Vice President Henry A. Wallace's 1944 mission to China.

Mr. Alsop, newspaper columnist who was an Air Force lieutenant assigned to escort Mr. Wallace in China, had hardly begun his statement when he was sharply interrupted by Senator McCarran, Democrat, of Nevada, chairman of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee.

The chairman demanded that Mr. Alsop "put up facts instead of theory and opinion and tirades" to prove his contention that Mr. Budenz, former Communist Party editor, committed perjury before the subcommittee.

Senator McCarran also complained that some of Mr. Alsop's columns, recently introduced into the Senate record, practically accused the subcommittee of "subornation of perjury."

Mr. Budenz testified recently that Mr. Wallace, although not a Communist, followed the Communist line in recommendations to President Roosevelt concerning political and military conditions in China. He also asserted that Mr. Wallace was "guided" along that course.

Those Budenz charges were denied by Mr. Alsop today as being "misleading and untruthful." Mr. Alsop denied that John Carter Vincent, a State Department career officer, who accompanied Mr. Wallace on the China mission, was a Communist. He declared that neither Mr. Vincent nor Owen Lattimore "guided" Mr. Wallace along lines advocated by the Communist politburo. Mr. Lattimore, a Johns Hopkins University professor and Far Eastern expert, went on the 1944 mission as a representative of the old Office of War Information.

Testimony by Mr. Alsop was in many respects the same as that of Mr. Wallace who was questioned by the subcommittee all day yesterday. Mr. Alsop declared that Mr. Wallace's recommendation for removal of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell as China-India-Burma Theater commander was "the heaviest blow to the Communist cause that could have been struck at that time."

Cites Stilwell Attitude.

"Gen. Stilwell was strongly gripped by certain attitudes favorable to the Communist cause," Mr. Alsop told the subcommittee.

The witness read numerous excerpts from Gen. Stilwell's papers and other documents and claimed that this material clearly showed that Gen. Stilwell disliked and distrusted Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator McCarran broke in to dispute Mr. Alsop's recollection that Mr. Budenz had testified that the dismissal of Gen. Stilwell carried out a Communist objective. The Senator contended that Mr. Budenz made no such specific reference to Gen. Stilwell and said, "I don't think you should paraphrase what you think a previous witness said when you are accusing that witness of perjury."

Reads Telegrams.

Mr. Alsop read telegrams he recently received from Maj. Gen. Clare Chennault and Whiting Willauer, supporting his contention that the late Gen. Stilwell sought aid for the Chinese Communists in 1944.

Mr. Alsop was on Gen. Chennault's staff when Mr. Wallace visited China. Mr. Willauer, now a business partner of Gen. Chennault's, was an adviser to the Chinese government at that time.

"At the time of Wallace's visit," Gen. Chennault's telegram said, "Stilwell actively supporting pro-

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William L. Laurence, author of "The Hell Bomb," and his wife are shown on a visit to Dr. Albert Einstein at his Princeton home last January

Science Writer 'Grades' H-Bombs; Opposes the Use of 'Rigged' Ones

By N. S. Haseltine

THE HELL BOMB. By William L. Laurence. Knopf. 198 pp. \$2.75.

THE UNITED STATES may be ready to test the H- (for hydrogen) bomb by early this summer, according to William L. Laurence, science reporter of the New York Times.

The apparently still nonexistent bomb Laurence speaks of in his new book is roughly 1000 times as powerful as the atom bomb which ended World War II.

Laurence, a veteran science writer, was the only reporter invited to pass the military secrecy barrier to see the A-bomb in its making, to witness the first A-bomb tests and to participate in the flight which dropped the second A-bomb on Nagasaki.

The author, so singularly favored in news coverage of the A-bomb work, disclaims any inside track, or secret information, for his summation of progress on the H-bomb.

All his information, conclusions and "guesstimates," he says, come from three sources: Published writings of scientists; "cats (let) out of the bag" by Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D., Colo.), and "some discussions" he heard during the atom bomb making days at Los Alamos, N. Mex.

LAURENCE'S FORECAST of early testing of a hydrogen bomb, he says, is based on "good reason," "in contrast to other conclusions in the book, such as his self-described "guesstimate" that Russia now has about six A-bombs, and will probably produce 12 more in the next two years.

As to how many A-bombs the United States has stockpiled, Laurence says merely "many more" than Russia. Russia, he concludes, is about three years behind the United States in A-bomb output and "even further behind" the United States in "potential production" of hydrogen bombs.

Laurence's book provides the ideal medium for him to set forth all his accumulated ideas on the H-bomb, discuss its potentialities for world destruction, war or peace, and even advance his theory of how such a bomb might be made.

In its most fearsome form, he says, the H-bomb could be "rigged" to rain radioactive destruction over the population of the entire earth. This could be done, he points out, by encasing the bomb in cobalt or other material which, made radioactive by the explosion, would continue to give off deadly rays for years.

But in a steel casing, which quickly spends its radioactivity, the hydrogen bomb might well be the most tactical weapon ever known. By its use, whole armies could be destroyed as they massed to invade another country. Similarly, because of the possibility of its use, such massing necessary to successful aggression might never be attempted.

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AS A TACTICAL WEAPON, the "non-rigged" or steel-encased H-bomb would be horrifying enough, according to Laurence's calculations of its power. Its blast effects, he says, would be sufficient to cause total destruction within an area of 300 square miles. Its incinerating effects would be such as to severely burn everything within an area of 1200 square miles.

"No army in the field or on the march could stand up against it," he declares. "Had we possessed it at the Battle of the Bulge, just one could have wiped out the entire Bulge. If the Nazis had had it before D-Day, one would have been enough to wipe out our entire invasion army... or wipe out our entire Normandy beach-head (after the landings)."

Writing his opposition to the use of "rigged" H-bombs, except in retaliation, Laurence proposes that the United States declare to the world that we will never be the first to use a "rigged" H-bomb. The "rigged" H-bomb, he points out, adds nothing to the military value of the "non-rigged" variety, which is sufficient in itself to accomplish military objectives.

But the United States, he writes, would be worse than foolish to make any open declaration that it would not use the military weapon variety of the bomb first—unless Russia made an equally sincere promise at the same time. For us to make such a declaration would only give Russia the assurance she needs to sacrifice her own A-bomb production toward the making of H-bombs, he declares.

The stockpile of A-bombs the United States now has is this country's best insurance toward keeping ahead of Russia in the race for the H-bomb, Laurence says. Plutonium, with which Russia is making its A-bombs, according to Laurence's deductions, is made in uranium plants needed to produce the chief ingredients of H-bombs.

LAURENCE SAYS that Senator Johnson, a member of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, tipped off anyone who cared to figure it out, how this country found out Russia had exploded an A-bomb, and the fact that the bomb was made from plutonium.

Senator Johnson (in a television broadcast directed largely at challenging the security-mindedness of A-bomb scientists) made three "inadvertent blurbs," Laurence writes. In one sentence, he says, Johnson "let at least three cats out of the bag."

Laurence lists these secrets as: confirmation that the Nagasaki bomb was made of plutonium; that the atomic "explosion" in Russia announced by President Truman was that of an atomic bomb, and that the bomb was made of plutonium.

By telling the world that the United States knew what kind of bomb the Russians had exploded, Senator Johnson also disclosed how that explosion was detected—by air samplings of radioactive particles, Laurence points out.

LIKE MANY scientists and science writers who have come up with versions of how an H-bomb might be made, the New York Times writer presents his studied own. And he backs it up, impressively, with statistics that make the reader's head spin.

The Laurence H-bomb would be initially fired by the heat of an A-bomb explosion. This A-bomb "match" would be kindled to proportionally stupendous heat by a relative small quantity of tritium, super-heavy hydrogen. And the ultimate heat produced would be sufficient to set off the (unlimited) quantity of deuterium, which is heavy hydrogen.

Ordinary hydrogen cannot be used for nuclear fusion, which is the principle of the super-bomb sought, as contrasted to nuclear fission in the A-bomb.

Tritium, alone, is too expensive for an H-bomb, Laurence says. Deuterium, alone, would not work because the A-bomb "match" would blow the supply away before it could be ignited by the A-bomb heat.

The Laurence H-bomb might also contain a "tamper" material, one which would delay explosion until the short-lived heat in his dual triggering set-up was built up to the high temperatures required to set off the deuterium. A-bomb scientists, facing a somewhat similar problem in development of the first bombs, once considered using some of our gold hoard at Fort Knox as a "tamper" material, Laurence says.

FORTUNATELY, Laurence says in his book, the United States has all the materials and facilities needed to produce an H-bomb. And at a not too staggering cost, since the country's A-bomb making facilities can be used. Both bombs can be made in the same kind of uranium plants.

This, says Laurence, poses a dilemma for Russia, if it doesn't have a large number of A-bombs.

"One may visualize," he writes, "the masters of the Kremlin gnashing their teeth in impotent rage at what they no doubt regarded as a diabolical plot on our part to sabotage their A-bomb efforts."

"Indeed, there can be no question that our decision to proceed with the (Hydrogen) Bomb was an answer to Russia's challenge to our atomic supremacy, and it now appears quite plausible that one of the motives behind the decision was the knowledge that it would force Russia either to build great additions to her A-bomb plants—or to curtail her production of A-bomb material."

Concerning the H-bomb that he forecast might be tested this summer, Laurence says it need not be, and probably won't be, one of the 1000-times-A-bomb strength variety. The size doesn't matter, he points out, because if a small one can be made, a big one can, too.

It might well turn out, he hazards, that the H-bomb test explosion will be tried at Eniwetok during the atomic tests scheduled there this spring.

LAURENCE CANNOT truly be branded a "scare writer." Twice a Pulitzer prize winner—in 1946 for his writings on the A-bomb work, and in 1937 for his news coverage of the Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Science—he has an enviable reputation with scientists, other science writers and the public.

His "Hell Bomb" book is, of course, hair-raising in its calm recital of the devastating effects of such a bomb. Some 400 "rigged" ones, he calculates, could destroy life on the earth for years to come.

So Laurence finds no obvious relish in writing of even deadlier potentials—from the work he says physicists are now studying in positrons, one of the energy constituents of the atom. Should positrons ever be released in large numbers, he says, "an eventuality by no means beyond the realm of the possible," it "would open potentialities of horror alongside which those of the H-bomb, even the rigged one, would be puny."

"Any process," he adds, "that would release positrons in the atmosphere, in a chain reaction similar to the one now liberating neutrons, may envelope the earth in one deadly flash of radioactive lightning that would instantly kill all sensitive things."

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Sun. Ed.

Dewey-Hanley Case Revived

By Drew Pearson

Senator Guy Gillette's Election Investigating Committee has dug up sensational information regarding the Dewey-Hanley controversy which turned the GOP high command into a lather last October.

Most sensational development of the recent election campaign was a letter by New York's Lieut. Gov. Joe Hanley, candidate for the Senate on the Republican ticket, revealing that he had received certain job promises from Governor Dewey if he would not run for governor. Simultaneously, it was revealed that Hanley had already been loaned \$30,000 by anti-Dewey forces including Congressman Kingsland Macy and Publisher Frank Gannett, in order to pay back debts and help him run for governor. But, despite this loan, Hanley bowed out of the gubernatorial race in favor of Dewey.

At that time Hanley explained that he needed the money to pay off a debt of honor incurred by his father. However, Senate investigators, after considerable probing, have about come to the conclusion no such debt existed.

Two Senate investigators, Edward McDermott and Bruce Altman, went to see Hanley in a Hudson, N. Y., hospital during the election campaign and interviewed him in the presence of his doctor and his son.

Hanley told the probers that he had inherited a \$75,000 debt from his father in a Muscatine, Iowa, bank which had gone into receivership. Under a State law, Hanley explained, stockholders in a bank had to pay a double assessment. He said he had paid most of it, but had \$31,000 left to pay.

Senate investigators asked for more details including the name of the bank, but Hanley's son cut them off.

"Your time is limited," he interrupted. "Let's not go into ancient history."



No Trace of Loan

The Senate agents have now gone to Iowa and checked the six banks in Muscatine County that folded in the 1920's and 1930's. They are the American Savings Bank of Muscatine, Atalissa Savings Bank of Atalissa, Nichols Savings Bank of Nichols, Citizens Savings Bank of Wilton Junction, Citizens Savings Bank of West Liberty and the Pleasant Prairie Savings Bank of Pleasant Prairie.

However, they could find no record of any bank stock in the name of John R. Hanley, Joe's father.

The investigators also checked the Comptroller of the Currency in Washington and failed to find any bank in Muscatine County with a double-assessment liability which closed during this period.

They also checked the probate file of Hanley's father at Muscatine. The sworn statement of the probate officer showed the elder Hanley had left \$100 in cash, \$500 in personal effects, a building valued at \$20,000, but no stocks, no bonds, and no debts.

In order to be absolutely fair to Hanley, the Senate Subcommittee is now running down another lead. Congressman Macy, who loaned Hanley part of the \$30,000, has told the investigators that Hanley mentioned a man in Iowa who kept pressing him for payment of a debt. Senate agents are now trying to run down this man. They are also checking to see whether the debts were in the name of Hanley's mother. So far they have found nothing.

Satevepost and McCarthy

Senator Jumping Joe McCarthy, "M. C." has now placed the Saturday Evening Post and one of its writers, Columnist Joe Alsop, on the list of those he accuses of being pro-Communist.

McCarthy made his charge because the Post dared publish an Alsop article critical of Jumping Joe. In retaliation, he followed his usual technique of inserting a letter to the Saturday Evening Post in the Congressional Record, and having thus secured immunity from a libel suit, he mailed it to the Post. The letter said:

"It is extremely disturbing to find that, because the elected representatives of the people are now attempting to remove sexual perverts and disloyal people from the Government, your magazine lends itself to the Lattimore-Compass-New Masses-Daily Worker that there is being created a gross miasma of fear in the nation."

It is also disturbing to find that this article is almost 100 percent in line with the official instructions issued to the Communists and fellow traveling members of the press and radio by Gus Hall, national secretary of the Communist Party. His instructions were as follows: 'I urge all Communist Party members and all anti-Fascists to yield second place to none in the fight to rid our

country of the Fascist poison of McCarthyism."

In other words, according to Jumping Joe, anyone who criticizes him is a Communist or fellow traveler.

Jumping Joe is also reported behind the recent charge that the Associated Press is angling its news toward "the left." The

charge was raised at the Associated Press managing editors convention in Atlanta, November 14-18, by C. A. Hazen of the Shreveport (La.) Times. He filed a report citing 58 cases in which he charged the Associated Press with left-wing bias. Most of these cases dealt with the Associated Press' handling of Senator McCarthy. (Copyright, 1951, the Bell Syndicate, Inc.)


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Old Way to Stop a Bandwagon



—Pointer, in The Detroit Free Press

as Tree, We've All Been Waiting For



—Yardley, in The Baltimore Sun

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Russia's Atom Bombs

The Alsops Cite Record in Reply To Isolationists' Denial of Peril

By Joseph and Stewart Alsop
WASHINGTON

ONE of the more sinister tactics adopted by the new isolationists is to disseminate the rumor that the Soviet Union does not, after all, have an atomic bomb. Not long ago Sen. Owen Brewster, of Maine, whose irresponsibility can always be relied on, told the Senate so in plain terms.

For the sake of the record, it is fortunate that much more can now be told about how the Soviet bomb explosion was detected. And the facts, if they are studied at all, prove conclusively what was exploded in the Soviet Union in September, 1949, was indeed an atomic bomb.

To begin at the beginning, the net for detecting a Soviet bomb explosion was established shortly after the war, by the combined effort of the three armed service staffs, the Joint Research and Development Board, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency. It consisted of four main parts.

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Third, and this is vital, air samples from the radioactive cloud can be taken by high-flying aircraft or balloons equipped with special apparatus. The radioactive particles thus caught can be subjected to mineralogical analysis, and the results tell much about the nature of the atomic explosion that has occurred. Arrangements to collect such air samples were also made.

FINALLY, all the data thus obtained can be precisely interpreted by properly trained scientists. This task, of interpreting and forming conclusions from the data collected, was intrusted to the Scientific Advisory Commission of the Atomic Energy Commission. This body, including such men as Professor Robert Oppenheimer, Dr. Enrico Fermi, Oliver Buckley, of the Bell Laboratories, and James Bryant Conant, president of Harvard, is as powerful and well balanced an assemblage of scientific minds as this country can muster.

When the Soviet bomb exploded

in central Siberia in September, 1949, all this elaborate organization, already trial-tested by our own Eniwetok bomb, went smoothly to work. The seismologists physically located the place of the explosion. The Geiger counter chain detected the radioactive cloud a little later. Air samples were immediately taken. The scientific analysts went to work.

The air samples provided the decisive evidence. In the Pentagon the hope was briefly entertained that instead of exploding an atomic bomb intentionally, the Soviets had accidentally touched off one of their radioactive piles. But the metallic components of a pile and a bomb are entirely different. A plutonium bomb, particularly, of the improved sort exploded by us at Nagasaki, contains highly special metals. And the air samples brought in radioactive metallic particles plainly indicating the explosion of a plutonium bomb at least of the Nagasaki type, if not better. Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sat with the Scientific Advisory Board in the last phase of preparation of their report to President Truman. All agreed on the conclusion, which was informally summed up by one of the authors of the report in a single, black sentence:

"The chances are 999 to 1 that it was a bomb that went off, and if it was not a bomb, neither I nor any of my colleagues can think of what it might have been."

SUBSEQUENTLY, secret intelligence confirmed the findings made in September, 1949. The highest intelligence sources now agree, moreover, that current Soviet bomb output is at the rate of about two a month, and by the end of the coming year will rise to five or more a month. Thus, as of now, the officially estimated Soviet stockpile is about twenty-four bombs; it will be nearly fifty bombs in another twelve months; and in two years it will be well over a hundred bombs. The military significance of this timetable does not need to be underlined.

Such, for the information of Sen. Brewster, are the undisputed facts. It is well to remember them, because this new isolationist denial of the Soviet bomb's existence recalls the tactics of the men who simultaneously told the British people in the late '30s that the enemy was too weak to attack, and that Britain was too weak to fight.

These men also were attempting to organize a subject surreptitious. Copyright, 1950, by The Alsop Column, Inc. 93-1951 SEP 12 1951
The Alsop column also appears in the Herald-Examiner, Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

Re-examinist Congress

Mark Sullivan Says the 82d May Be Known by That Name

By Mark Sullivan

WE SHALL see this week the sitting of what the calendar and official terminology describe as the Eighty-second Congress. But in terms of what is practically certain to be the dominating concern of this Congress, it might be called the Congress of Re-examination; it may readily be that history will give it that name. And while the almanac and the Constitution fix Jan. 3 as the beginning date of the Congress, the date of what determines its principal business is some two months earlier, the date our forces and those of the United Nations began retreat in Korea.

Preceding the retreat in Korea the country went upon a group of assumptions. With complete confidence we assumed that the United Nations forces would triumph in Korea. With somewhat less confidence but nevertheless with hope and optimism, we assumed that there would not be a third world war, certainly that one was not imminent. On a long-term basis, going back to the end of the second world war in 1945 at the setting up of the United Nations, we assumed that peace would somehow be attained.

Defeat in Korea, rapid worsening of it, and gradually dawning apprehension of still worse, were a complete bouleversement of the assumptions we had entertained. The changed condition now confronting us was as something new, something terrible and threatening, and having upon us almost the effect of unexpectedness and shock that the attack of Pearl Harbor had nine years ago.

THE condition called for instant examination. It called for going to the bottom of our situation, both as an individual nation and as the strongest of the non-Communist nations, the spearhead of resistance to the Communist attempt at world domination. We were called on to go to the bottom of all this and to decide upon a course based upon what we found.

This was called for but was not done. It rarely is in such periods except by top military strategists, and these quite properly withhold their findings and recommendations from the public.

During some four weeks following realization of the extent and meaning of the disaster in Korea, the country heard earnest addresses from two top government officials, President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson. These were generalized expressions of the gravity of the situation and of the need for action; earnest statements of, and appeals to the public for, high resolution. A third address to the nation, by Governor Dewey of New York, was an especially scathing talking

might be taken by any military strategist: Mr. Hoover envisages the coming struggle as being on our part of the kind that military men speak of as a "defense in depth." In this conception, and considering the great gravity of our danger, Mr. Hoover thinks the imperative thing is that the last line of defense be made absolutely secure. And the last line of defense is the United States; we are at once the strongest of the non-Communist nations and the most distant from the enemy. That we be secure is the condition of avoidance of complete disaster to all the non-Communist nations. With the last line made secure we can in that condition spare help to the Western European and other nations composing the front line so far as they show willingness and strength to defend themselves.

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Mark Sullivan's column also appears in the Herald Tribune on Wednesday.

The Dissatisfied Customer



—Seibel, in The Richmond Times-Dispatch

The 'Voice' in Red China

State Department Denies Radio Stirs Up Enmity Toward West

By James E. Warner

WASHINGTON, and cameras. All these are favorites of Kremlin representatives who quit the shores of the United States to return to the production paradise of the Soviet Union. The excess baggage carried by the Chinese party was so far over the air-line allowance that Wu was assessed \$1,621 in transportation charges. He paid this with two \$1,000 bills.

Another broadcast told how "The Chinese World," described as an anti-Communist and anti-Chiang Kai-shek newspaper in San Francisco, published a letter from a student in Canton telling how the "volunteers" for Chinese Communist forces in Korea were raised.

"On Nov. 9 all of us students received forms to fill out for immediate duty for the Korean war of liberation," the letter beamed back to the Chinese mainland recounted. "An attached notice said that general mobilization would be decreed in a few weeks anyhow and that those who volunteered now could choose their branch of the service. . . ."

"A meeting of all students was called and a Communist organizer asked all students who wished to volunteer to stand up. Very few dared to remain seated."

The letter went on to tell of the

From letters coming from behind the "bamboo curtain" and from the stories of refugees who have escaped from Communist China, the State Department asserts that the contrary is true—that Voice broadcasts beamed in from Japan and the Philippines are eagerly listened to and are breeding distrust among the people for the Russian-dominated Red Chinese leadership.

As for the British newspaper's suggestion that the Voice is convincing Chinese listeners the United States favors Chiang Kai-shek and wants his return to the mainland, the experts were even more puzzled. They assert they have leaned over backward to cling to the official pronouncements of this government made by President Truman and others that the problem of Formosa is one for international settlement later, and that the interest of the United States currently is solely to neutralize Chiang and Formosa.

They are under no such inhibitions, however, in "needling" the



Matter of Fact

How Red A-Blast Was Detected

By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

ONE OF THE MORE sinister tactics adopted by the new isolationists is to disseminate the rumor that the Soviet Union does not, after all, have an atomic bomb. Not long ago Senator Owen Brewster of Maine, whose irresponsibility can always be relied on, told the Senate so in plain terms.

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"The chances are nine hundred and ninety-nine to one that it was a bomb that went off, and if it was not a bomb, neither I nor any of my colleagues can think of what it might have been."

Subsequently, secret intelligence confirmed the findings made in September, 1949. The highest intelligence sources now agree, moreover, that current Soviet bomb output is at the rate of about two a month, and at the end of the coming year will rise to five or more a month. Thus, as of now, the officially estimated Soviet stockpile is about 24 bombs; it will be nearly 50 bombs in another 12 months; and in two years, it will be well over 100 bombs. The military significance of this timetable does not need to be underlined.

Such, for the information of Senator Brewster, are the undisputed facts. It is well to remember them, because this new isolationist denial of the Soviet bomb's existence recalls the tactics of the men who simultaneously told the British people in the late '30s that the enemy was too weak to attack, and that Britain was too weak to resist. These men also were attempting to organize their country's abject surrender.

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Matter Of Fact

By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

The Time Is Now

AT BRUSSELS. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and the other Atlantic Pact Foreign Ministers have made another of their convulsive efforts to begin the job of building Europe's defenses. The best commentary on the seemingly vital results—agreement on rearming Germany, appointment of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as European supreme commander—is provided by the following melancholy sequence.

Last March, in the crucial directive No. 68, the National Security Council set the time of utmost peril as 1959-54. By then, the Council agreed, the Soviet Union would be ready for major aggression. Before then, the Council therefore concluded, the defenses of the West must be urgently rebuilt. The June meeting of Atlantic Pact Foreign Ministers in London, which did little else, at least accepted this timetable established by our Security Council.

Then in July, when the Korean aggression occurred, the State Department initiated an amendment to N.S.C. No. 68. The time of utmost peril was now set as 1951-52, or at best 1952-53. When Louis A. Johnson was driven from the Defense Department, American policy and planning were keyed to this new timetable. Hence, in New York in September, Secretary Acheson brutally and suddenly confronted Ernest Bevin and Robert Schuman with a demand for immediate Franco-British agreement on rearming Germany to assist in defending Europe.

NOW, in December, after the massive Chinese intervention in Korea, and on the eve of an expected Chinese invasion of French Indo-China, the timetable, as officially forecast, is being telescoped again. The new time of utmost peril is set as 1950-51. In other words, the experts and leaders of the American Government expect major Soviet aggression now, today, tomorrow, next month, next spring, next summer. And American political and strategic plans are again being painfully adjusted to this second new timetable.

What is anticipated has already been reported in this space. The onslaught upon French Indo-China, which all signs suggest will occur very shortly, is to set off a chain-reaction of surrender in Southeast Asia. The disasters in Southeast Asia, coming on top of the disaster in Korea, are to demoralize and paralyze the nations of western Europe.

With the western Europeans trembling and passive, a new attack is to be launched in Europe in the spring, probably against Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia falls, "third force" governments, obedient to the Kremlin, are to be installed in France and Italy. And with Europe divided and controlled, the British Isles are to be neutralized, and this country is to be left, naked and alone, to meet its final fate when the Kremlin has digested its vast conquests.

There are several things to be said about this planned political chain-reaction, in which the Korean war must be regarded merely as the first explosion. For one thing, much depends upon whether the experts are right in selecting Yugoslavia for the victim of the spring attack, or whether more weight should be given to the evidence that Western Germany will be the victim. In the latter case, in view of the presence of American, British and French occupying forces in Germany, there will be war beyond question in the spring.

IF THE attack is upon Yugoslavia, however, the Kremlin will be adhering to its policy of seeking all the fruits of a gigantic and overwhelming victory in a world war without fighting the world war. In the long run, the consequences of a successful attack upon Yugoslavia will be no less far-reaching than the consequences of an attack upon West Germany. But since British, French and American forces will not be directly involved, the Western allies will have to be far more resolute and forehanded in order to halt the chain-reaction before the position becomes hopeless.

At the same time, General Eisenhower's assignment will make this resolution and forehandedness far more difficult to achieve. As of today, Switzerland, Sweden and Yugoslavia are the leading military nations in Europe. If General Eisenhower were backed up by Winston Churchill as dictator of the West, it would still take at least two years to build a solid European defense. Instead, the job is to be done, as Brussels revealed, by a continuous process of negotiation, compromise, and half measures. In these circumstances, there is no use pretending that much can be accomplished before the anticipated world crisis in 1950-51.

This does not mean that the task of rearming Europe is to be abandoned. There is always the off-chance that the new timetable is wrong, in which case it would be criminal to neglect the opportunity to buy peace cheap, by rebuilding Europe's defensive strength. In any case, every man that is trained for Europe, every weapon that is ordered, will surely be badly needed somewhere, somehow and soon.

What the new timetable means, in fact, is simply that the primary responsibility to defend the cause of freedom in the world now more than ever rests squarely and exclusively upon this Republic. If the forecast of the experts is correct, every American in these next months is likely to have to make the choice between fighting for freedom, or surrendering ignobly to the forces of darkness.

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Matter Of Fact

By Joseph and Stewart
O'Alsup

The Young Gentlemen

THE OTHER DAY a new experience—a visit from the FBI—came to these reporters. It was a surprisingly sociable, indeed a downright genial meeting. The two agents representing the bureau were decent, intelligent young men. They neither blustered nor talked nonsense. A shrewd but friendly inquisition merged, almost insensibly, into a friendly parting. Nothing could have been more painless.

In the background of this jolly chat, however, lurking, as it were, behind the curtain of amiability that enclosed the conversation, there were one or two things that were decidedly disagreeable to think about.

To be specific, the misdeed being investigated was no sinister subversive activity. It was the publication of the proof that the Soviet atomic explosion was the planned explosion of a workable atomic bomb, and the disclosure of the best estimates available of the stock of atomic bombs accumulated by the Kremlin since the seismographs picked up the earthquake in central Siberia. This was the crime that led President Truman to order a "security investigation." It would have been more fitting to investigate why the leaders of this Nation failed to impart such vital information to the American people on their own initiative.

THE TWENTY or thirty bombs now in the possession of the Kremlin, the 100 or more atomic bombs the Kremlin will have in another 18 months, are not after all pretty baubles by Faberge. Their mere existence intimately, directly and deeply affects the world position of the United States, the future of the free world, the individual future of every American citizen. Their existence, in short, is one of the three or four salient facts that must influence every decision of national policy.

In Russia, no doubt, such knowledge may be closely guarded. But ours is a free society, whose masters are the people of the United States. The great decisions of national policy are made by the people, and not by the President, or the Secretary of State, or any other temporary officeholder. In order to decide wisely, the people must be informed. And it is the most sacred trust, the most important single duty, of the highest public servants, to inform their masters, the people, so that the decisions of the people may be wise.

As Winston Churchill brilliantly proved, facts which are matters of life and death can always be presented honestly to the people, even in circumstances of great delicacy and danger, without giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Suppression of such facts is not a sign of prudence. It is a sign of leadership that is feeble, or dishonest, or both.

If the leaders wish to represent a disastrous program of disarmament as "cutting fat without muscle"; if they desire to bemuse the people about the meaning of such a great event as the Soviet atomic explosion; if they are pretending that the chances "were never better for peace" with Korea just around the corner, it is only natural for everything to be classified except the toilet paper. Such is the rule that has been followed in Washington, more or less consistently, for the past two years.

In these circumstances, it becomes the duty of every self-respecting reporter to dig out, not any facts which are properly secret, but the essential facts which affect the national posture and welfare. It is a risky business; for reporters and editors cannot know what is known to Presidents and Secretaries of State—exactly how to present these vital facts so that no harm is done. But if the press lets itself be transformed into a mere machine for transmitting the doctored handouts of shabby politicians, the press has abdicated its chief function.

There are other points besides the foregoing that are raised by the recent visit of the young men from the FBI. A whole chapter might be written on the shocking but increasing use of these "security investigations," not only as a weapon to muzzle the press, but as a weapon of inter-departmental bureaucratic war.

ANOTHER CHAPTER might be devoted to the methods used—the broadside inquiry which in these reporters' experience at least never hits the target; the wholesale harassment of innocent men on the method of "who knows whom"; the unashamed official practice of the very same guilt-by-association which is considered so shocking when indulged in by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. Something more might even be said about the scrupulosity of the FBI as compared with the State Department's special agents, who have done things in the past two years that must have made Secretary of State Acheson's great master Mr. Justice Holmes turn in his honored grave.

But there is no space here to go slumming in these purlieus of the American Government. The point here is very simple indeed. In a free society, secrecy is not security. National ignorance is the shortest road to national annihilation. And this "security investigation" caused by the publication of information most vital to the national future shows how great is the confusion and the danger.

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Matter of Fact

By Joseph Alsop

Mr. Dunn's Dilemma

ST. PAUL, Minn.—Mr. Roy Dunn, best known nationally as Minnesota's Republican national committeeman, is a political landmark of this city. He is well made for a landmark, being a huge, craggy-faced, slow-moving, slow-spoken man, with an appearance of assured authority that is only enhanced by his manner of being a solid farmer at a county fair. And he has a landmark's appropriate story, being the son of very poor homesteaders who has become a rich farmer, a successful businessman and a major power in Republican politics by dint of hard work, strong character and deep shrewdness.

Back in the 1930s, when the Farmer-Laborites took over Minnesota, Roy Dunn persuaded the State's almost hysterical businessmen to keep cool and let him handle the situation. He handled it with great efficiency, using funds contributed by the quaking business groups for a successful campaign to recapture the State Legislature. He has controlled the Legislature ever since, although Harold Stassen would certainly have liked to break his power if possible.

ROY DUNN'S constituents are still the Minnesota farmers who elect him and his faithful followers to the Legislature, and the Minnesota businessmen who pay the Republican Party's bills. He can technically be called a servant of the interests. He frankly believes that what the businessman want and what the farmers want are good for Minnesota.

He gives the businessmen what they want, to the best of his ability.

He is therefore cordially detested by the State's labor groups and liberals. But it would be hard to discover any man more different from the "servant of the interests" of the Eastern urban imagination. In truth, itinerant students of politics will have to go pretty far to find a more astute or likable man, whatever they may think of his politics.

In a way, this is a very happy time for Roy Dunn. The departure of Harold Stassen to the larger opportunities of Pennsylvania has left a vacuum in Minnesota. Partly because of Dunn's control of the Legislature, the change wrought by Stassen in Minnesota Republicanism was always pretty patchy. Now the younger men who were brought into politics by Stassen are losing interest again. The Stassen group is accordingly losing strength in the Republican Party. And the faction of Roy Dunn and the businessmen, with its support from the farm vote, is recapturing control. Stassen's hand-picked Governor Youngdahl is likely to be reelected almost without opposition, but he will be an isolated figure.

DESPITE the polls, Dunn also expects to carry Minnesota for Gov. Thomas E. Dewey and Senator Joseph Ball. Thus it would seem that every prospect ought to please him. But the worm in his apple of contentment still remains, in the form of a dilemma which also afflicts many comparable but much less likable Republican potentates.

As is natural in view of his background, Roy Dunn strongly favors the New Deal's farm programs, while taking a highly conservative position on labor, power and other great domestic issues. In the same way, many Eastern Republican leaders are relatively amiable toward labor, but ungenerous to the farmers and conservative about power; and Northwestern Republicans are progressive about power and reclamation policies, friendly to the farmers, and violent about labor.

Roy Dunn's dilemma can be simply stated. If the issues listed above and the others like them were submitted to a free vote by the Republicans presently in Congress, shifting majorities would give the victory to the conservative viewpoint in each case. The effect in Minnesota would be, primarily, further impairment of the Government farm programs along the lines of the grain trade lobbyists' raid on the Commodity Credit Corporation at the last session. That raid alone, by abolishing Government storage of grain given as security for parity loans, is going to force many Midwestern farmers to sell much of their huge corn crop well below the parity price. The farmers' fury will eventually be sated by vic-

IN OTHER States there would be other repercussions. Where union labor is more important, for instance, the effect of the same process would be to solidify all union members against the Republicans. Ask Roy Dunn what will happen if the next Republican Congress takes the bit in its teeth in this manner after the party has recaptured the Presidency. Being far more intelligent than many of his brethren, Dunn will tell you simply, "Why, then, the Republicans will lose the Congress in 1950 and the White House in 1952."

And precisely here is Dunn's dilemma. For if this dread development is to be averted, farm State Republicans like Dunn, for example, will have to become much more modern-minded about labor; those from less rural regions will have to acquire a new tolerance of the needs of the farmers, and the whole Republican mass will have to grow less accessible to the surviving business lobbyists.

In other words, their party's coming to power will confront men like Dunn with an unpleasant, largely unexpected choice: Either they will have to change their spots far more than they have done in the long, hard, hungry 16 years now ending, or they will have to see the power and the glory they have so longed for go glimmering again very soon. There is only one other, alternative, forecast by the Dixiecrats. Perhaps we are reaching a stage when the two-party system will break down and the dominant interests in each section will try to wreck their prejudices on every other section.

Roy Dunn, who is attached to his party and to the two-party system, hopefully expects Gov. Thomas E. Dewey to solve the problem, which is perhaps the best way out for him.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

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September 29, 1948

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Matter of Fact

U. S. 'Wasting' 5000 Desertions

By Joseph and Stewart Alsop

KRAVCHENKO, Gousenko and the other well-publicized individual deserters from the Soviet system have evoked a fascinated interest in this country. But almost no interest has been aroused by the far more extraordinary fact that more than 5000 Russian officials, military officials and soldiers belonging to the Soviet military government and occupation forces in Germany, have deserted to the western zones in the past two years.

Evidently a single Kravchenko, if he writes a book, is capable of capturing the public imagination. Every one of these Russians who have fled from the Soviet zone has taken greater risks to find freedom than Kravchenko took. Nevertheless, the 5000 constitute too massive and incredible a phenomenon to make much impression.

The fact of these mass desertions from the Soviets, first reported in this space and not since disputed, also poses an important and curious issue of public policy. The issue can be stated very simply: Does the American tradition of welcoming political refugees still mean anything at all, or are those who choose freedom simply to be told to go back to slavery, without further ado?

U. S. Had Initial Stake

THE problem arises in connection with these Russian officers, officials and soldiers for a very curious reason. It is now the official rule of the American Military Government that these men must be returned to the dreadful justice of the Soviet secret police, if they are so unlucky as to be caught in our zone of Germany.

This rule arises from an agreement made, at the end of the war, between the Soviet and American commands in Germany. The agreement required each command to return deserters to the other. There was, at the time, some reason for the agreement, since a small number of American troops had been left behind in the part of the Soviet zone first occupied by our forces.

So far as is known, there was no reason at all for the infamous parallel agreement, that Russian prisoners of war and other Soviet citizens found by us in Germany would also be returned to the Soviet Union, even if they were unwilling to be repatriated.

But this agreement was also reached and enforced.

Long ago, when it became apparent that large numbers of Soviet officers and officials desired to desert to the west, a group within the American Military Government in Germany began to advocate jettisoning these agreements with the Soviets. The proposal was vetoed by Gen. Lucius D. Clay. The problem was then raised on a higher level, in Washington, but abandonment of the exchange of

deserters agreement was again vetoed by Secretary of State Marshall. That is why the agreement is still in force.

Damming a Flood

THERE does not seem to be any very good reason why it should still be in force, except the inbred reluctance of military men to encourage desertion, even from the forces of the enemy. There are many excellent reasons on the contrary why the agreement should be jettisoned. The main one is that the present flow of deserters from the Soviets could be transformed into a flood by a change in the rules.

A wise German politician, intimately acquainted with the Soviet setup, remarked to one of these correspondents in Berlin: "Soviet headquarters would be deserted if your people would just offer any Russian crossing to your zone 40 acres of land and a mule in America." This pithy statement is confirmed by informed authorities in Washington.

A real flood of desertions from the Soviets in Germany would have two obvious results. In the first place, no more effective or more punishing device of psychological warfare could possibly be imagined. Russians in Germany have already had their dependents called home, and have been required to live in guarded barracks, in order to limit desertion to the western zones. The desertions continue.

If they swelled to a flood, the administration of the Soviet zone would certainly be part-paralyzed by the combined effects of universal mutual suspicion and stringently tightened security precautions. In the second place, those who have fled already have provided invaluable information about the inner workings of the Soviet system. The more who come over, the more will be learned.

Include Top Scientists

THE names of the more recent deserters are closely guarded, although it is known that they include at least one colonel general and many other personalities of equal importance. Certain names can be listed, however, of former German prisoners of war who have managed to elude the subsidiary exchange agreement.

A. Karpinsky, former professor of geology and hydrology at the Leningrad Mining Institute and a leading expert on Soviet mineral resources; K. G. Molodetsky, former director of the economic department of the Institute of Peoples of the North; L. N. Smirnov, former professor of petroleum geology at the Leningrad Institute, and V. Brailovsky, one of the first Soviet physicists to explore nuclear fission, are among the Russians now hidden in Germany. Surely men of this type, whether former prisoners of war or more recent escapees, should be brought to America under some relaxation of the immigration laws, to be formed into an Institute of Russian Studies.

Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Jones
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

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Ladd

Clegg

Glavin

Nichols

Rosen

Tracy

Harbo

Alden

Belmont

Laughlin

Mohr

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Nease

Gandy

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ADD 1 ALSOP

AT ONE POINT COMMITTEE COUNSEL JAY SOURWINE ASKED ALSOP TO READ VERBATIM A PORTION OF BUDENZ' TESTIMONY. SOURWINE CONTENDED THAT ALSOP SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO USE PARAPHRASES WHEN TRYING TO SHOW "PERJURY" BY A PREVIOUS WITNESS.

ALSO BASED HIS CONTENTION THAT THE WALLACE MISSION DID NOT FURTHER COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES ON THE WALLACE RECOMMENDATION, CABLED TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM CHINA; THAT GEN. JOSEPH W. STILWELL BE RELIEVED AS THE U.S. COMMANDER IN CHINA. ALSO DESCRIBED THAT RECOMMENDATION AS "THE HEAVIEST BLOW TO THE COMMUNIST CAUSE IN CHINA THAT COULD BE STRUCK AT THAT TIME."

ALSO PREFACED HIS PRESENTATION, WHICH WAS DOCUMENTED WITH EXCERPTS FROM BUDENZ' TESTIMONY AND STILWELL'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS, BY SAYING HE PLANNED TO SHOW THAT BUDENZ HAD EMPLOYED "GROSS DISTORTION AND DECEPTION" IN SAYING THAT WALLACE MISSION PRODUCED RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WERE WELCOMED BY THE COMMUNISTS.

ALSO WENT BACK TO A 1938 INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY PREPARED BY STILWELL, THEN A COLONEL IN CHINA, WHICH DECLARED THAT "ONLY THE REDS HAVE A DEFINITE PLAN" FOR WAR AGAINST THE JAPANESE. ALSO CONTENDED THAT THE "GERM OF MILITARY PREJUDICE" REVEALED IN STILWELL'S EARLY REPORT BECAME A "FULL-FLEDGED INFECTION" WHEN STILWELL BECAME U.S. COMMANDER IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH NATIONALIST GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

QUESTIONED BY SUBCOMMITTEE COUNSEL ROBERT MORRIS, ALSOP INSISTED THAT THE BACKGROUND ON STILWELL WAS RELEVANT TO THE COMMITTEE'S INQUIRY. HE SAID IT SHOWED STILWELL'S POSITION ON THE NATIONALIST-COMMUNIST FIGHTING IN CHINA AND WAS PERTINENT TO BUDENZ' STATEMENT THAT THE WALLACE RECOMMENDATION FOR STILWELL'S OUSTER FURTHER THE COMMUNIST LINE.

MORRIS SAID BUDENZ DID NOT CONTEND THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS FURTHERED COMMUNIST POLICY SPECIFICALLY THROUGH THE DISMISSAL OF STILWELL.

BUDENZ HAD CONTENDED THAT LT. GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER, RECOMMENDED BY WALLACE FOR STILWELL'S JOB, WAS NOT, AT THAT TIME, KNOWN BY THE COMMUNISTS TO BE STRONGLY ANTI-RED.

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